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Preface 
Armed Forces must be able to operate in a Darwinian environment, in which swift adaptation 
to ever changing situations is key to success. The fundamental driver to such adaptation is 
experience, both from within the organisation and from external sources such as allied, 
neutral and opposing forces. 
The active collection of those experiences, their thorough analysis and the agile 
implementation of vital modifications form a learning process that constitutes a critical 
competence for every army. 
However, I found that outcomes of external research as well as the Norwegian Army’s own 
personnel often displayed great scepticism regarding the quality of that competence. During 
the process of writing this thesis I realised that this scepticism was not fully justified, although 
there is room for further improvement. The conclusions from this thesis can contribute to this. 
It was a pleasure to write this thesis, not in the least because the colleagues at the Norwegian 
Defence University College in general and my tutor, Ms Torunn Laugen Haaland in 
particular, have been providing me with highly valued support. I gratefully thank them for 
that. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Norwegian Army Command, and especially 
Lieutenant Colonel Geir Husby, for providing me with the opportunity to use precious time 
and resources on this project. 
 
 
Oslo, May 15th, 2019 
 
 
 
Marcel Wassenaar 
Lieutenant Colonel 
Dutch Exchange Officer at the Norwegian Army Command 
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Summary 
Both NATO and the Norwegian Government consider it of crucial importance for armed 
forces to actively learn from experiences, gained during operations and exercises. The armed 
forces that are able to effectively learn quickest will have a significant advantage over their 
opponent(s). This thesis identifies and explains differences and similarities in the processes 
used by the Norwegian Army to learn from experiences during its operations in Afghanistan 
in the period from 2005 until 2012 and during the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018. 
The comparison of the two cases is based on an analysis of previous research, related to the 
Afghanistan period, on a series of interviews with personnel throughout the Norwegian 
Armed Forces’ and Army’s hierarchies and on a study of relevant orders and documents.  
In both cases, there was no organisation-wide lessons learned process present within the 
Army that was specific or detailed enough to be used throughout the whole of the 
organisation. However, case-by-case guidance initiated at the level of the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters and tailor-made to the operation or to the exercise, was issued. Generally, this 
guidance was quite effective but there were differences in its reach. In Trident Juncture, the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters used the peacetime chain of command, involving also the 
Norwegian Army Command and Brigade North. In the Afghanistan period, using the mission 
chain of command, guidance was given directly to the battalion level. Subsequently, the 
involvement of the Army Command and Brigade North in those lessons learned processes 
was significantly less. 
Furthermore, it proved to be challenging to compare previously identified lessons with new 
lessons, predominantly because a usable (database-) system to support such analysis was 
lacking. 
Finally, committing personnel to lessons learned processes, either on a dedicated position or 
as an appointed officer with primary responsibility besides the regular job, enhanced the 
conduct of lessons learned processes noticeably. 
Improving knowledge of lessons learned processes throughout the Army’s hierarchy could 
further enhance the formalisation, and with that the capability, of learning from experience.  
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Sammendrag 
Både NATO og den norske regjeringen anser det som avgjørende for væpnede styrker å aktivt 
lære av erfaringer, oppnådd under operasjoner og øvelser. Det forsvaret som er i stand til å 
lære seg raskest, vil ha en betydelig fordel over motstanderen sin. Denne masteroppgaven 
identifiserer og forklarer forskjeller og likheter i de prosesser som den norske Hæren har brukt 
til å lære av erfaringer under sine operasjoner i Afghanistan i perioden mellom 2005 og 2012 
og under øvelsen Trident Juncture i 2018. 
Sammenligningen av de to sakene er basert på en analyse av tidligere forskning relatert til 
Afghanistan-perioden, på en rekke intervjuer med personell gjennom Forsvarets og Hærens 
hierarkier og på en undersøkelse av relevante ordrer og dokumenter. 
I begge tilfeller fant det ingen erfaringshåndteringsprosess i Hæren som var spesifikk eller 
detaljert nok til å bli brukt gjennom hele organisasjonen. Det ble imidlertid utstedt spesifikk 
veiledning fra Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter. Veiledningen var skreddersydd til hver 
operasjon eller øvelse og generelt sett ganske effektiv, men det fant forskjeller i rekkevidde. 
Under Trident Juncture brukte Forsvarets operative hovedkvarter den vanlige 
(freds)kommandokjeden, som også involverte den norske Hærstaben og Brigade nord. Under 
Afghanistan-perioden ble veiledning gitt direkte til bataljonsnivået. Dermed var involveringen 
av Hærstaben og Brigade nord i erfaringshåndteringsprosessen betydelig mindre. 
Videre viste det seg å være utfordrende å sammenligne tidligere identifiserte og analyserte 
erfaringer med nye, hovedsakelig fordi et brukbart (database-)system for å støtte en slik 
analyse manglet. 
Til slutt var en tydelig konklusjon at å tilvise personell til erfaringshåndteringsprosessen, 
enten i en dedikert stilling eller som utnevnt offiser i tillegg til den vanlige jobben, forbedrer 
gjennomføringen av prosessen betraktelig. 
En fordyping av kunnskapen om erfaringshåndteringsprosesser gjennom hele Hærens hierarki 
kan forbedre formaliseringen av læring fra erfaring, og dermed læringsevnen, ytterligere. 
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1. Introduction 
History has demonstrated repeatedly that success now and in the next war may 
depend on how well we capture the best practices from the current fight, harvest 
the durable knowledge, and integrate it into our doctrine. 
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) E.J. Degen, U.S. Army 
 
Wednesday, the 17th of January 2018. Almost sixty students at the Norwegian Command and 
Staff College are following a lecture on the Norwegian Armed Forces’ (NAF) lessons learned 
process. A central hub within this process is FERDABALL1, a database program meant to 
register and archive lessons learned within the Norwegian Armed Forces. The majority of 
those nearly sixty students, all with a long career within the armed forces behind them, had 
never heard of FERDABALL before. Those who did had no trust in it2… 
Ten years earlier, in 2007, the Norwegian Government directed the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in a White Paper to develop a knowledge-strategy, in order to collect own and others’ 
experiences on the tactical and operational levels and to process and analyse those 
experiences into lessons. Those lessons would be used to adapt doctrine, tactics and 
techniques, and would be imported in the Norwegian Armed Forces’ relevant courses, 
training and exercises, and in the daily practice of its operational units (Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence, 2008, p. 126). In the ten years that followed the 2007-2008 White Paper, a 
number of additional guidelines were issued to implement a solid system for learning lessons 
within the Armed Forces, but how such a process should function in practice has never been 
fully described (Svinndal, 2015, p. 4). Something the senior students’ reaction during that 
lecture on lessons learned processes clearly confirmed. 
The importance for armed forces to learn from experience is not only stressed by the 
Norwegian Government. Also within NATO, the cornerstone of the Norwegian Defence 
Policy (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 4), there is a strong focus on being able to 
learn lessons from experience to improve and to adapt: 
 
                                               
1 Forsvarets ErfaringsDatabase Lessons Learned, the Norwegian Armed Forces Lessons Learned Database 
2 The author was present during that lecture, as a student. 
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In an uncertain and continuously changing security environment, learning 
lessons to improve is an essential part of being credible, capable and adaptive 
in warfighting and warfare development. In a complex and rapidly changing 
security environment lessons need to be learned fast.  
(Bi-Strategic Command Directive 080-006 Lessons Learned, NATO, 2018) 
 
The ability to deliberately learn from experience is for armed forces even more crucial than it 
is for most other organisations. Most organisations learn in order to perform better at a certain 
task in comparison with competition or in comparison with certain norms and standards. A 
mobile phone manufacturer for example aims at producing a better product, as perceived by 
consumers, and at selling it at a lower price-point than its competition. The competition tries 
to do the same. A hospital aims at delivering higher quality healthcare at a lower cost in order 
to effectively provide better care for more patients. For armed forces however, the aim is to 
perform better at tasks in direct confrontation with their competitors. Competitors that at the 
same time learns from their experiences, too. The armed forces that are able to learn from 
experience quickest, will have a significant advantage over their opponent3(s). 
It can thus be concluded that both the Norwegian Government and NATO consider the ability 
to learn from experience as a crucial competence for armed forces to be successful. This leads 
to the theme of this thesis: organisational learning from experience. Its scope is limited 
specifically to the processes linked to learning lessons during exercises and operations within 
the Norwegian Army4, as they are (or are not) conducted in the recent past and in the present 
time.  
1.1 Previous research 
The topic of organisational learning has gained a huge increase in attention in the recent 
decades, starting from the late 1970’s and intensifying since the late 1990’s. This increase 
includes a stronger focus on studying learning in service organisations (Argote, 2013, p. V), 
such as armed forces. Adapting organisations to ever changing environments, learning lessons 
from experienced success and failure, and conducting experimentation to test future concepts 
have all become usual elements of driving an organisation (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p. xvii). 
                                               
3 Where “opponent” is used, one can also read related terms such as warring factions, enemy, hostile parties, etc. 
For readability purposes, only one term is used. 
4 A nation’s army is generally that part of its armed forces that is specialised to operate in the land domain. Other 
parts of armed forces can for example be the navy, airforce or marine corps. 
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Especially between 2007 and 2018, there has been much attention to organisational learning 
within the Armed Forces, both from government officials and military institutions as from 
various researchers. Often, but not always, the conclusion was that the Armed Forces were not 
performing adequately when it came to exploiting their own experiences from exercises and 
operations (e.g. Haaland, 2016; Hennum, Eggereide, & Rutledal, 2010; Hennum, Rørvik, 
Dahl, & Rutledal, 2008). Other researchers concluded that although the processes within the 
Armed Forces were not established very thorough, the Armed Forces’ units did learn their 
lessons, predominantly on the lower tactical levels (e.g. Weideman Eriksen, 2017, p. 16). 
The ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces and their units to learn during operations in 
Afghanistan, from 2001 until the present day, has been studied extensively (e.g. Haaland, 
2016; Nesheim, 2016; Svinndal, 2015). Seen from the perspective of conducting research on 
learning within a military organisation, it is a logical choice to study the deployments to 
Afghanistan. There, the military is set in a relatively new environment, often with new 
assignments and competition with unknown or uncertain capabilities, goals and objectives. 
Learning from experience and transferring those lessons to other parts of the organisation 
becomes even more crucial under such demanding circumstances than under regular 
peacetime conditions. Since the Armed Forces as a whole were involved in the operations in 
Afghanistan, the study of transferring lessons bottom-up through the whole of the hierarchy 
becomes possible, too. 
In this thesis the previously conducted research, much of which is very relevant to the 
Norwegian Army’s performance when it comes to learning from experience, is used 
extensively in order to examine its lessons learned processes. 
1.2 Research question 
The inducement of this thesis is based on two factors previously mentioned in the 
introduction. First, the personal experience of the author that about fifty professional officers 
with a long career within the Norwegian Armed Forces did not know what the central 
database-system for lessons learned within the Armed Forces was (FERDABALL), or even 
worse: that they perceived it as useless. Second, that research from the last decade often 
concludes that the Armed Forces and the Norwegian Army have not performed very well with 
respect to learning lessons from experience. 
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Aim of this thesis is therefore to identify whether the processes used by the Norwegian Army 
to learn from experience during the operations in Afghanistan and during the exercise Trident 
Juncture, more than five years later, differ from each other. What are the differences and 
similarities and how can they be explained? 
The following research question will be answered: 
What are the similarities and differences between the way the Norwegian Army and its 
subunits learned from experience during the operations in Afghanistan from 2005 until 2012 
and the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, and how can they be explained? 
Like the operations in Afghanistan, the major exercise Trident Juncture in 2018 provided the 
Army and its units throughout the hierarchy with a situation that differed significantly from 
their peacetime environment. Furthermore, this exercise provided the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and the Army with a prime opportunity to conduct a structured lessons learned 
process. A process that can be compared with the one in use during the Afghanistan period. 
1.3 Definitions 
Before defining three different variations of lessons learned procedures, the concepts of 
process and procedure are described, followed by an explanation of the difference between 
formal and informal processes. 
Process versus procedure 
In this thesis, the terms process and procedure are used frequently. The difference between 
those terms is quite relevant. A process is defined as a series of actions or steps taken in order 
to achieve a particular end5, while a procedure is an established or official way of doing 
something6. The difference between the two is thus that while a procedure exists purposely a 
process can occur unintentionally. 
  
                                               
5 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/process 
6 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/procedure 
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Formal versus informal processes 
A distinction is made between formal and informal processes. An informal process is a 
process that occurs without being described in advance while a formal process is a process 
that has been. Describing a process to formalise it can be as straightforward as including it in 
a unit’s standard operating procedures. 
The three forms of lessons learned procedures 
Three different versions of lessons learned procedures can be distinguished: an organisation-
wide procedure, a unit-level procedure and case-by-case guidance. 
An example of an organisation-wide procedure is NATO’s lessons learned process. NATO 
uses a clear definition of its lessons learned process, that can be used within this thesis as 
well: 
A lessons learned process is a procedure for staffing observations arising from 
an activity and developing them into a lesson learned. (NATO, 2011b, para. 14) 
The purpose of a lessons learned procedure is to learn efficiently from 
experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way 
of doing things, in order to improve performance, both during the course of an 
operation and for subsequent operations. (NATO, 2011a, para. 0454) 
Two elements within NATO’s lessons learned process are worth naming here, because they 
are used in this thesis as well: the lesson identified and the lesson learned.  
NATO defines a lesson identified as7: 
A mature observation with a determined root cause of the observed issue and a 
recommended remedial action and action body, which has been developed and 
proposed to the appropriate authority.  
 
NATO defines a lesson learned as8: 
An improved capability or increased performance confirmed by validation when 
necessary resulting from the implementation of one or more remedial actions for 
a lesson identified. 
 
                                               
7 NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (2016, p. 12) 
8 NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (2016, p. 13) 
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NATO’s lessons learned process is implemented top-down, and generally applicable to all 
NATO headquarters. In this thesis, the Army’s lessons learned process is analysed on 
multiple occasions. It is defined as an organisation-wide procedure for staffing observations 
arising from an activity and developing them into a lesson learned. That procedure is formally 
implemented within the Army and applicable within all levels of its hierarchy. 
The second form of a lessons learned procedure is a unit-level procedure. That form occurs 
when a unit has stated how to conduct lessons learned processes in its standard operating 
procedures or other steering documents. A unit-level procedure can be in place without an 
organisation-wide lessons learned process being present. 
The third form of a lessons learned procedure is defined as case-by-case guidance. That form 
is applicable when an order is issued related to a specific event, describing how learning from 
experience related to that event has to be conducted. An example of such an event can be an 
exercise or a specific operation. 
1.4 Limitations 
Organisational learning is influenced by many factors. Various researchers identify for 
example the influence that culture has on the ability of an organisation to learn. This thesis 
does not deny the importance of culture, but its focus is solely on the existence of lessons 
learned processes, leaving cultural influences out of the equation. 
This research does not aim at identifying the internal quality of the lessons learned processes 
within the Army. It identifies whether or not processes are in place, and if they are in place as 
a result of formal guidelines and routines. If a process is in place, it is not assessed whether or 
not the process is conducted successfully, or if it can be improved. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis follows the method of research, as it is explained in paragraph 2.1.  
After this first chapter, chapter two shows the used method of research. 
Subsequently, chapter three aims at developing a model that can be used to analyse the 
lessons learned processes as they occurred during the Army’s operations in Afghanistan from 
2005 until 2012 and during the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.  
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In chapters four and five, that analysis is conducted on both cases respectively, followed by 
the comparison in chapter six. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by presenting the conclusions. 
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2. Method of research 
This second chapter provides insight in the used method, the research design, the types of 
used data, how that data is collected and how the research quality is guaranteed. 
The method used in this thesis is the comparative case-study. This method is used to acquire a 
deep level of understanding on one or some in time and space limited objects or processes 
(Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2002, p. 169). In this thesis, the comparison is made between the 
Army’s lessons learned processes during the operations in Afghanistan between 2005 and 
2012, and its processes related to the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018. 
The research has a strong open and inductive character: the data within this thesis is first 
collected, then structured and categorised and finally analysed. 
2.1 Research design 
The research consists of four phases (see Figure 2-1). In the first phase, using general theory 
on organisational learning and relevant military literature, a theoretical model is developed. 
This model must be suitable to systematically analyse the process(-es) used to learn from 
experience within all levels of the Norwegian Army. 
In the second phase, the developed model is used to map the conclusions of previous research 
on the Army’s ability to learn during its operations in Afghanistan in the period 2005-2012. 
In the third phase, by using documents currently in use within both the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and the Norwegian Army and by conducting interviews with personnel involved in the 
lessons learned processes within the organisation, the current processes-in-use are analysed 
and mapped into the model. This is limited in time and space by examining the lessons 
learned processes as they were in use with respect to the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018. 
In the final phase, the results of the second and third phase are compared and analysed, 
leading to conclusions and, where possible, to recommendations. 
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Figure 2-1: Research design 
 
2.2 Collection and analysis of data 
Following the thesis’ research design (Figure 2-1), various types of data are used. In phase 
one, scientific literature from established scholars on organisational learning and military 
literature on the subject of learning lessons from experience, predominantly from NATO and 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, is used. Then, in phase two, recent research on the Army’s 
lessons learned processes during the operations in Afghanistan is collected and mapped. 
Subsequently, in phase three, data related to the Army’s lessons learned processes with 
respect to Trident Juncture is collected using interviews and documents from within the 
Armed Forces and the Army. 
The analysis of data will be conducted following Miles and Huberman’s matrix method 
(Swanborn, 1996). In this method, all data is registered in a temporarily “monster matrix”. 
The matrix consists of categories and sub-categories, which are initially defined using the data 
that is found during phase one of the research. Further analysis of that data leads to a 
refinement of the used categories before the start of phase two and to the sub conclusions at 
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the end of phase two. In phase three, the matrix provides the basis for the questionnaire. Its 
analysis leads to the phase’s sub conclusions9. 
There are a number of software-applications available to help researchers developing and 
using such a monster matrix. In this thesis, however, the choice is made to use Microsoft 
Excel. A choice made due to limited resources, both in time to get acquainted with such 
software, as in budget to acquire software with sufficient reliability, quality and user-
friendliness. 
The research within this thesis and its use and storage of data is authorised by the Norsk 
senter for dataforskning (Norwegian Centre for Research Data10) and registered under project 
number 981644. 
Interviews: sampling and questionnaire 
The sampling procedure in a qualitative study is not as exhaustive as it would be in a 
quantitative one. Focus in this thesis is to interview personnel throughout the hierarchies of 
the Armed Forces and the Army that has or is expected to have a functional relationship with 
the lessons learned processes as they were in place during and after the exercise Trident 
Juncture in 2018. 
The interviews were conducted with individuals in an open, semi-structured manner and had a 
duration of one to maximum two hours. Where possible, they were held at the office of the 
interviewees to minimise the context-effect, where the interviewee can be influenced by an 
“artificial” interview location and hence is inclined to give more “artificial” answers 
(Jacobsen, 2015, p. 152). 
A questionnaire was used to structure the interviews, supporting the interviewer to ask the 
right questions without interfering too much with the informal setting of the conversation and 
without making the interview too pre-defined or overstructured (see Annex A: Questionnaire). 
In order to build trust and the right amount of openness, the interviews were conducted in a 
                                               
9 Developing categories in this fashion is called open coding or first-cycle coding, followed by axial-coding or 
second-cycle coding (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 207) 
10 https://nsd.no/nsd/english/ 
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face-to-face setting instead of using means like chat, e-mail or phone (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 
148). For the same reasons, the interviews were not recorded. 
Notes were made by the interviewer during the interview. After the interview, those notes 
were transcribed, and the interviewees were given the opportunity to read through the 
transcription of their interview and to give suggestions for adjustment. This way, data quality 
and coherence is guaranteed to the maximum extent possible. 
2.3 Validity, reliability and generalisation 
Leung (2015) gives a clear description of validity in qualitative research:   
Validity in qualitative research means “appropriateness” of the tools, processes, 
and data. Whether the research question is valid for the desired outcome, the 
choice of methodology is appropriate for answering the research question, the 
design is valid for the methodology, the sampling and data analysis is 
appropriate, and finally the results and conclusions are valid for the sample and 
context. 
 
The theoretical model, developed in chapter three, aims at maximising the validity of the 
conducted research. Based on a strong theoretical foundation, and used to systematically 
define clear variables with related, highly usable indicators, it provides the foundation to both 
the interview questions and the structure of the used “monster matrix”, used to collect and 
analyse the data, and to answer the thesis’ main research question. 
Here, a possible weakness within the thesis becomes visible. Using previous research as a 
source of data for analysing the conduct of lessons learned processes during the period the 
Army was conducting its operations in Afghanistan is not without risk. As opposed to 
conducting interviews, where the researcher can define questions tailor-made to the actual 
research, previous research is often conducted with other goals and methods in mind, making 
it possibly less usable or reliable. This risk is mitigated as much as possible in two ways. In 
the first place, the high amount of previous research enhances its usability substantially. In the 
second place, by using the model as developed in chapter three in a strict manner, relatively 
objective and reliable conclusions can be drawn. 
Reliability is defined by the measure of replicability of the research: if the same research 
would be conducted a second time, using the same methods and sources, would the result be 
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the same too? Within qualitative research, this is hard to accomplish, yet essential to pursue. 
One factor that does guarantee a relatively high level of reliability, is the fact that this thesis 
seeks primarily for the presence of formal and/or informal (lessons learned) processes 
throughout the hierarchy of the Army and throughout the various phases of organisational 
learning. The search for such processes is relatively binary, since they are either present or 
not. This means that the research within this thesis can be conducted with a relatively high 
amount of reliability without implementing additional measures. One measure that was taken, 
though, is that the interviewees had the opportunity to read through the interview’s transcript 
and to suggest changes before it was used within the research. This way, the reliability of the 
output of the interviews was further improved. 
A factor that in theory could lead to a lower reliability is the relatively low number of 
interviews that was conducted (“small N”). Within most units, only one person was 
interviewed. The interviews were held with selected persons who had the most insight in the 
presence of lessons learned processes within that particular unit, minimising that issue: if 
those persons did not have any knowledge on the presence of formal processes, then it would 
be safe to conclude that they indeed did not exist. Interviewees were selected in three ways. In 
units where personnel was working in positions dedicated to lessons learned processes, the 
head of the respective office was interviewed (the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the 
Land Warfare Centre). At the levels of the Army Command and Brigade North, it was the 
higher level that identified the persons that were assigned as officers with primary 
responsibility for lessons learned processes within those units. Finally, at battalion level, the 
head of the operations branch was selected. The operations branch is responsible for lessons 
learned processes at battalion level, as was confirmed during the interviews. Furthermore, it is 
not to be expected that the content of the interviews will have a negative impact on the 
interviewees’ career or working sphere. This was assessed by the author in advance and 
discussed with the interviewees before or after the actual interview. 
The author of this thesis is also working within the Norwegian Army, which can have 
advantages and disadvantages. One of the main disadvantages is that working within an 
organisation can lead to blind spots (Hecke, van, 2007), where one becomes biased, having 
one’s former experiences influencing the findings of the research. Since the author had only 
been working within the Norwegian Army for about six months at the time of the start of the 
research, it is not to be expected that a possible “blind spot” will be of big influence on the 
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research. An advantage is the relatively easy access to the Norwegian Armed Forces (intranet) 
systems. 
As Jacobsen states, it is often hard to generalise the results of qualitative research from a 
small sample to a larger population (2015, p. 237). In this thesis, the interviewees from the 
various units are expected to represent the whole of the unit, and to be able to give a clear 
overview of the processes related to lessons learned as they are or are not in use within that 
specific unit. In that sense, the result of one interview is generalised to the whole of the 
respective unit. Care has therefore been taken to select the right person to be interviewed. 
Generalising the conclusions of the thesis to be applicable to another army, or to another 
branch within the Armed Forces is expectedly not possible, but the model used to analyse the 
Army’s lessons learned processes as it is developed in chapter three could be applicable as a 
basis for analysing the lessons learned processes of other organisations, too. 
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3. From theory to a model 
This chapter aims at developing a theoretical model that can be used to systematically analyse 
the Army’s lessons learned processes, both during its operations in Afghanistan from 2005 
until 2012 and during the exercise Trident Juncture 2018. 
In the first paragraph, organisational learning as a concept is untwined, defining four elements 
that are used to understand its theoretical basis. Then, Argyris´ theory on single and double-
loop learning is used to explain how the various levels within the Army´s hierarchy are 
conceptually linked within the lessons learned processes. The third paragraph presents the 
model that is used within this thesis to analyse the lessons learned processes, including the 
operationalisation of that model. The chapter concludes by explaining how the phases of the 
learning process are categorised and labelled within this research. 
3.1 Organisational learning unravelled 
There is a wide range of possible definitions on organisational learning available in 
contemporary literature. According to Argote, however, most researchers agree that 
organisational learning is a change in the organisation’s knowledge that occurs as a function 
of experience (2013, p. 31). This change is, or should be, not just focused on changing 
behaviour, but on improving that behaviour as well. Argyris and Schön (1996), for example, 
define instrumental learning as an organisation’s improvement of its task performance over 
time.  
Following Argote’s definition, three elements of organisational learning are examined here: 
organisational knowledge, experience, and the process(-es) leading from experience to a 
change of the organisational knowledge.  
Organisational knowledge 
Argote states that knowledge within an organisation is stored within four elements: its 
members, its technology, its structure and routines and its culture (2013, p. 91). This is 
strengthened by Levitt and March, who argue that learning within an organisation changes the 
routines that guide its behaviour (1988, p. 320). Those routines generally include the same 
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aspects as Argote’s definition of organisational knowledge. Some examples are knowledge, 
rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, technologies and culture. 
Argyris and Schön (1996, p. 13) argue that the way an organisation conducts complex tasks 
also represents organisational knowledge. They use the term “theory of action”, which 
describes the action-strategy the organisation perceives fit to follow in order to reach a desired 
end-state in case of a certain situation (if situation A applies, then action-strategy B must be 
followed in order to reach desired end-state C). Organisational knowledge does not only 
include the action-strategy to follow, but also provide answers to the questions what it is that 
makes end-state C desirable, and why the organisation assumes that given situation A, action-
strategy B will lead to desired end-state C. 
For armed forces, the ability to conduct a suitable action-strategy can be described as a 
military capability: the ability to conduct military tasks in order to reach a desired end-state. 
Within NATO, the following elements are often used to analyse and describe military 
capabilities: Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and 
Interoperability, or DOTMLPF-I (NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, 2016, 
p. 44). This acronym has also been used by Hennum et al. to provide a list of areas that 
organisational learning within the Norwegian Armed Forces can stimulate improvement in 
(2008, p. 44). 
Within this thesis, organisational knowledge related to the conduct of operations and exercises 
within a military organisation is defined as shown in figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Knowledge within a military organisation 
 
In this figure, one can see that for a military organisation conducting an operation or an 
exercise, organisational learning would involve the change of organisational knowledge, 
being one or more of the following: 
– Element(s) within the DOTMLPF-I framework; 
– Values related to the measure of desirability of the chosen end-state; 
– Assumptions why the chosen action-strategy would indeed lead to the desired end-
state. 
Experience as a source for learning 
Most scholars agree that experience forms the initiation of learning (e.g. Argote, 2013; 
Dewey, 1966; Nesheim, 2016). Experience can have many forms and can be analysed along 
many dimensions. A clear example of that is the distinction between direct and indirect 
experience: is it one’s own experience or has it been experienced by someone else? Argote 
(2012) also distinguishes other possible variations between types of experience. Examples are 
success versus failure experience, easily interpretable versus ambiguous experience, 
experience from novel tasks versus from tasks that have been executed repeatedly in the past 
and the distinction that can be made related to the extent to which the experience has been 
simulated. A simulated experience can for example be the training of an emergency drill 
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within an office or a school, or the conduct of an experiment. One could argue that a military 
exercise is a perfect example of a simulated experience. Argote states that a simulated 
experience can be a valuable complement to real experiences, especially when that experience 
is scarce and/or the stakes are high. In the military, the real experience could be war, 
something that for armed forces involves very high stakes and is (fortunately) very rare, at 
least for the Norwegian Army. 
An experience is formed when an individual understands the relationship between an action 
and its consequence (Kiær & Mørk, 2012). This implies that it is only the individual that can 
form experiences. As Kim (1993) argues, individual learning is a prerequisite for learning on 
the group- and organisational levels, because the organisation is composed of individuals and 
it is the individual that conducts tasks within the organisation. Here, a fourth relevant element 
of studying organisational learning is introduced: the level of analysis. This element is 
discussed in the next paragraph. 
The level of analysis 
As seen in the previous paragraph, learning within an organisation takes place on various 
levels. Most scholars identify the individual level, the group level, the organisational level 
(e.g. Kim, 1993) and the level above the organisation, with can be named for example the 
intra-organisational level (Argote, 2013, p. 20) or the systemic level (Weideman Eriksen, 
2017, p. 9).  
Although experiences are formed exclusively at the level of the individual, those experiences 
and learned lessons must be integrated within the organisation’s mental model for 
organisational learning to occur (Hennum et al., 2008, p. 13). Here we see the link between 
the various levels: learning at the levels above the individual can only take place when 
experiences and lessons are transferred throughout those levels. 
Defining the various levels within the Norwegian Army is less obvious than it might seem, 
but crucial to develop a theoretical model that can be used to systematically analyse its current 
lessons learned processes. The individual level is defined by the single employee within the 
Army. That employee can work within a unit, conducting highly technical tasks like 
patrolling an area as part of a small group or maintaining a main battle tank, but it can also be 
a staff officer working at the Norwegian Army Command who is for example involved in the 
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preparation of units to operations abroad. Employees from both examples form experiences 
during their work. Those experiences can lead to learning at the individual level, but also at 
the group or the organisational level. 
It becomes difficult when trying to define the group and organisational levels within the 
Army. If we follow the definition of an organisation (Argyris, 1996, p. 8), we consider a 
group of individuals as an organisation when three conditions are met. First, there must be a 
boundary between the members and the rest of the world. Second, individuals must be given 
authority to act for the collective. Finally, there must be agreed-upon procedures for making 
decisions in the name of the collective. Argyris and Schön add that for an organisation to 
become relevant for studying organisational learning, it must operate on a continuing basis 
instead of being erected to reach a certain objective on a short term and subsequently dissolve 
upon reaching that objective11. 
If we would examine the Norwegian Army’s units throughout its hierarchy, one distinction 
presents itself. Whether one would analyse a single eight-person group, a platoon, a company, 
a battalion, Brigade North or the Norwegian Army as a whole, one would find that each and 
every unit complies with Argyris and Schön’s first and second condition: the members of the 
“first platoon” are clearly within other boundaries than those of the “second platoon”, and its 
members are or can be authorised to operate on behalf of their respective platoons. The same 
applies to members of a company, a battalion, etc. 
The third condition is harder to satisfy, yet it is very relevant for this thesis. It is about making 
decisions in the name of the collective of the respective organisation. In the previous 
paragraphs, we have seen that organisational learning involves changing the organisation’s 
knowledge, and that for the Norwegian Army, that knowledge consists of the elements within 
the DOTMLPF-I-framework, the values related to the desirability of the end-state and the 
assumptions why an action-strategy would lead to that desired end-state, given the current 
situation. 
Within the Army’s hierarchical organisation, none of the levels is authorised to change all 
elements of DOTMLPF-I, but each level has the possibility to change at least some of them. 
                                               
11 Argyris and Schön use the example of a group of students mobbing against a university policy. It can adhere to 
all three conditions, thus being an organisation, without being an organisation we can study with regard to 
organisational learning. After the mobbing, this temporary organisation will probably disintegrate instantly. 
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Since organisational learning for a military organisation involves changing the values of the 
DOTMLPF-I elements, it is relevant to analyse what level is authorised to change which 
elements. Table 3-1 provides a refinement of the DOTMLPF-I framework into possible areas 
of change12 and table 3-2 shows the various levels within the Army and to what extent each 
level is able to change (or directly influence the change of) the defined areas. 
 
DOTMLPF-I element Possible areas of change 
1. Doctrine 1a. Conceptual guidelines, doctrine at the tactical level and above (e.g. 
FFOD13) 
1b. Standard Operating Procedures 
2. Organisation 2a. The structure of the organisation 
2b. The organisation’s values and priorities 
3. Training 3a. Training 
3b. Exercise 
4. Material 4a. Main weapon systems / platforms 
4b. Low-cost material 
5. Leadership 5a. Principles of leadership 
5b. Education of leaders 
6. Personnel 6a. Education / courses 
7. Facilities 7a. Buildings, simulators 
8. Interoperability 8a. Cultural, technical and/or doctrinal interoperability with armies of other 
nations. 
Table 3-1: DOTMLPF-I elements 
 
 
 
  
                                               
12 Inspired by the possible areas of change described by Hennum et al. (2008, p. 16), and the explanation on the 
various elements of DOTMLPF-I as given in the Joint Analysis Handbook (2016, p. 45). 
13 Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, or the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine. 
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Area: 
Level: 
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b 6a 7a 8a 
Army 
Cmd 
             
LWC              
Brigade              
Battalion              
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2: Authority to change DOTMLPF-I elements 
 
It is important to note that table 3-2 is based on the author’s experience within the (Royal 
Netherlands) Army. It was not possible within the timeframe and scope of this thesis to 
confirm all elements within this table. Furthermore, that would be a subjective exercise: some 
would for example argue that the brigade level does have strong influence on principles of 
leadership within the Army (5a in the table), while others would argue quite the opposite. The 
intention of presenting this table is to show that there are relevant differences in the amount of 
influence each level has. Especially between the level of the brigade and the levels above the 
brigade, the differences are significant. 
Each level within the Army must be aware of two things when it comes to learning from 
experience. First, it must understand the amount of authority and influence it has to change 
the various elements of DOTMLPF-I. Second, it must know what level within the 
organisation is authorised to change those elements it is not able to change itself. That way, 
identified lessons can be send to the level with the proper authority without unnecessary and 
undesirable delays. 
Legenda 
Green:  Change at the respective level 
Yellow: Infuence change 
Grey:  Not able to change or influence  
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Learning processes: from experience to a change in knowledge 
In the previous paragraphs, the three elements of organisational learning (experience, 
organisational knowledge and the level of analysis) were defined. In this paragraph, the 
process that turns an experience into a change of organisational knowledge is described, 
distinguishing between learning at the individual level and learning at the organisational level. 
Below, after explaining learning at the individual level, the link to the organisational level is 
made. 
Kolb describes learning as the process where knowledge is created through the transformation 
of experience (1984, p. 38). An individual learns because it experiences and because it 
conducts reflection on those experiences. Dewey (1966) states that reflection is the 
discernment of the relation between what we try to do and what happens in consequence. 
In this thesis, Kim’s OADI-cycle is used: this cycle provides a clear and understandable link 
between learning within the individual and learning within the organisation as a whole. Kim 
describes that an individual: Observes a concrete experience, Assesses that observation, 
Designs an abstract construct that seems to be an appropriate response to the assessment and 
then Implements that design into the concrete world (1993, p. 39). Within the individual, this 
cycle leads to change. On the one hand, the individual learns how to conduct an action in a 
more suitable way to reach its objective or to conduct its task. On the other hand, it learns 
why that new action is an improvement over the old one, and why it thus leads to preferable 
results. Kim defines this as the difference between know-how and know-why, or between 
operational learning and conceptual learning. The combination of know-how and know-why 
forms the individual’s mental model. 
At the organisational level, one can also distinguish a mental model: the combination of the 
organisation’s know-why and know-how. Examples of an organisation’s know-why are its 
view on the world (or Weltanschauung as it is often referred to) and the organisation’s 
perception of its role in the world. Examples of its know-how are its standard operating 
procedures and routines. The mental model of the organisation is influenced by its members’ 
mental models. In fact, all individuals share their organisation’s mental model. Kim therefore 
uses the term Shared Mental Models to describe an organisation’s mental model (1993, p. 45). 
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Kim furthermore states that: the strength of the link between individual mental models and 
shared mental models is a function of the amount of influence exerted by a particular 
individual or by a group of individuals (1993, p. 45). In other words: the mental model of a 
person with more influence within the organisation, for example the CEO, will probably have 
a stronger influence on the organisation’s shared mental model than an employee lower in its 
hierarchy. 
Spector and Davidson claim that an organisation will only learn as long it is able to willingly 
manage the learning process (2006). Following Kim’s model, however, any organisation will 
learn. Its members form experiences during the execution of their jobs. They assess the 
relationship between action and consequence and design and implement alternative actions as 
they consider required or possible. This is not necessarily a conscious process. Jarvis (2015) 
for example makes a clear distinction between conscious and unconscious learning from 
experience. The result, however, is the same: the person’s mental model changes as a result of 
experiences. Depending on the role and the influence the person has within the organisation, 
its shared mental model will change accordingly. 
As people learn from experience in conscious and unconscious manners, that same distinction 
can be made in the study of learning-processes within an organisation. Unconscious learning 
in this sense would be the change of the organisation’s shared mental model without using 
any formal processes, just relying on Kim’s OADI-cycle to take place. Conscious learning on 
the other hand would involve the organisation’s formal, established processes aimed at 
learning from experience. 
In the introduction of this thesis it became clear that the ability to learn effectively from 
experience is a crucial competence for armed forces to be able to defeat their competitors, 
something clearly stressed by both the Norwegian Government as by NATO. This implies 
that the Norwegian Army cannot rely solely on its “natural” or informal processes of learning 
as described above, but that it must deliberately use routines to capture the changes in the 
individual members´ mental models and incorporate them into its shared mental models.  
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An armed forces’ organisation-wide lessons learned process can be seen as an example of 
Popper & Lipshitz’  definition of Organisational Learning Mechanisms (OLM): 
institutionalized structural and procedural arrangements that allow organisations to learn 
non-vicariously, that is, to collect, analyse, store, disseminate and use systematically 
information that is relevant to their and their members’ performance (1998). This implies that 
the Army’s lessons learned process should incorporate mechanisms focused on the collection 
of information, at the analysis of that information and at the storing of it. Storing in this 
context means transferring it into the army’s organisational knowledge (or its shared mental 
model). The Army’s lessons learned process should also include the dissemination of valuable 
lessons to other parts of the organisation. All this should be done in a systematic manner, 
guaranteeing a sufficient level of quality of the process. 
Sub conclusions 
It is the individual within the organisation that experiences, forming the start of the learning 
process. After observing the experience, an individual assesses it, reflecting over the 
relationship between action and consequence. It then designs an appropriate response to the 
assessment and implements it. This leads to a change in the individual’s mental model, being 
both its know-how and its know-why, whether conscious or not. The change in the 
individual’s mental model can lead to a change in the organisation’s shared mental model. In 
this case, it is relevant how much influence the person has within the organisation. 
This goes for any organisation, whether it willingly manages its learning processes or not. If 
an organisation seeks to learn actively, it will need routines, or Organisational Learning 
Mechanisms, that collect, analyse, store and disseminate lessons in a systematic way. For 
armed forces, this is a crucial competence. 
3.2 Single and double-loop learning within the Army 
Argyris and Schön  have defined single and double-loop learning (1996). Single-loop learning 
occurs when learning within an organisation leads to a change of the action-strategy that aims 
at reaching the desired end-state. Double-loop learning leads to a change in the values related 
to the measure of desirability of the chosen end-state, and/or the set of assumptions why the 
chosen action-strategy would indeed lead to the desired end-state. 
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An example of single-loop learning for the Norwegian Army could be that it, based on an 
earlier experience, concludes that it needs additional long-range artillery-capacity in order to 
be able to successfully conduct combat against an expected opponent. In this example, 
learning would lead to a change within one of the DOTMLPF-I elements. An example of 
double-loop learning for the Army could be that it, based on experience, concludes that it 
cannot rely on the required support from the allied nations it assumed to receive to be able to 
defend Norway. Assumptions on which the initial action-strategies were based, have to be 
changed in the latter example, leading to major changes in the Army’s perception of its means 
and goals. Double-loop learning is used to resolve issues that are difficult, embarrassing and 
threatening (Argyris, 1996, p. 81). Reflecting on years of scholarly experience within the field 
of organizational learning, Argyris (1996, p. 81) also states that: 
It was rare to find organisations producing double-loop learning even when 
their survival depended upon it.  
 
The last example, where the Army concludes it cannot rely on its allies is indeed quite 
extreme and would not only have military but also political implications. It is not hard to 
imagine that such a form of double-loop learning would not be conducted lightly. However 
rare it may be, the concept of single and double-loop learning can be used within this thesis to 
understand the relationship between learning at the various levels. A small adjustment of the 
concept would be required, though. Single-loop learning within this thesis is defined as 
learning where the level that conducts the analysis of an own experience has the authority to 
make changes in the relevant elements of its own DOTMLPF-I. An example of that would be 
a battalion that loses a battle during an exercise. The operations officer observes the 
experience, analyses the cause of the defeat and concludes that with a small adjustment of the 
doctrine-in-use, the next battle could be won (assuming that all other variables would remain 
constant). Following his job description as an operations officer, he is authorised to 
implement that change, which he does, closing the single-loop learning process. The lesson 
has been learned, since the experience has led to a change in the organisational knowledge of 
the involved unit in one single loop. 
If that same operations officer would conclude that a change in the battalion’s doctrine would 
not suffice, but that a change in its set of main weapon systems is required to be able to win 
the next battle, he would understand that he is not authorised to make the relevant change to 
the DOTMLPF-I. In that case, the experience needs to be brought up to the relevant level 
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within the armed forces that can authorise or directly influence the acquisition of new main 
weapon systems. That second step could be defined as an example of double-loop learning. 
Following this reasoning there are two types of lessons possible within the Norwegian Army: 
lessons as a result of single-loop learning and of the defined double-loop learning. Haaland 
(2016, p. 1001), summarising various researchers, among which Theo Farrell (2010), defines 
learning within a military organisation in a comparable manner, distinguishing between 
adaptation and innovation. 
The relevance of this distinction is significant within this thesis. In order to successfully 
conduct a formal lessons learned process, each level within the hierarchy of the Army should 
make a distinction between single-loop lessons and double-loop lessons, since the processing 
of the two types of lessons require completely different mechanisms. A single-loop lesson can 
be implemented at the respective level and transported to the higher and/or adjacent level, 
only to be disseminated further within relevant parts of the organisation. A double-loop lesson 
cannot be implemented at the respective level and needs to be transferred to the higher level, 
accompanied by sufficient information for the higher level to be able to analyse the lesson. 
Furthermore, each level must be prepared to receive lessons from its lower level. There, it 
needs to analyse whether it is an already implemented lesson or not. In the first case, the 
analysis must focus on whom the learned lesson can be relevant for. In the second case, the 
respective level needs to actively work on implementing the lesson, or on transferring the 
lesson even further up within the hierarchy, until it reaches a level with sufficient authority to 
make the change, or to decide not to implement the lesson. 
In order to successfully conduct a lessons learned process within the Army, each level within 
the hierarchy must thus be able to distinguish the difference between single and double-loop 
lessons and to act accordingly. It must be clear that the definitions on single and double-loop 
learning as used in this thesis are not important here: it is however crucial that the 
mechanisms as described above are used. Not differentiating between the two types of lessons 
could for example lead to haphazardly collection of lessons in a central database. If the 
organisation does not know what level is responsible for the implementation of an identified 
lesson, its reaction will most likely be to store it in a database “for later use”. 
From theory to a model 
 
 
  
 
 
26 
3.3 The model 
In the previous paragraphs, the elements of organisational learning have been defined: 
experience, organisational knowledge, the process(-es) leading from experience to a change of 
the organisational knowledge and the various levels of analysis. Furthermore, it was argued 
that it is of crucial importance for the Norwegian Army to develop and sustain Organisational 
Learning Mechanisms (OLM), including mechanisms for the collection of experiences, the 
analysis and storage of them and the dissemination of valuable lessons to other parts of the 
organisation. Those mechanisms should include distinguishing between single and double-
loop learned lessons and be present in a structured manner within all hierarchical levels of the 
Army.  
Table 3-3 is used to support the analysis of the lessons learned processes as they are in place 
throughout the Army’s hierarchy. 
Level14 
Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC     
LWC     
BDE N     
BN level     
Table 3-3: Analysis of lessons learned processes 
 
In this model, the individual level is not depicted. In the first place, processes can be in place 
within an organisation that lead to individuals taking action with regard to learning processes, 
but (formal) processes cannot be in place within an individual. In the second place, 
individuals are present within all layers of the Army’s hierarchy. It is those individuals that 
form the experiences, starting the learning process, disregard the level they are working at.  
Operationalising the model 
In order to be able to use the model to analyse the Norwegian Army’s lessons learned 
processes, more refinement is needed: it needs to be operationalised. In this thesis, that is 
done by defining variables within each phase of the learning process within the model: 
                                               
14 See Annex B: Abbreviations 
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variables that can be used to define whether or not mechanisms are in place within that area. 
The defined variables are used to formulate questions in the interview guide and to analyse 
the collected data, by means of further refining the variables into indicators. 
Here, the inductive character of qualitative research becomes apparent: the list of indicators 
had not been defined definitively before the interviews were conducted. The interview guide 
was adjusted where required as a result of earlier conducted interviews. During the various 
interviews, new indicators were found that have been incorporated in the model accordingly. 
For most of the indicators, an additional question is relevant: is it part of a formal process or 
has it been embedded within the organisation or the unit on an informal basis?  
Phase in the learning 
process 
Variable Indicators 
1. Collection of experience a) The unit collects its 
experiences from own 
personnel within the 
respective unit/level. 
 
1. Conducted meetings related to 
experience (e.g. internal After Action 
Reviews, Post Exercise Discussions). 
2. Internal standard operating procedures 
on how to report experiences. 
b) The unit induces its lower 
units to learn from 
experience using formal 
processes. 
1. Existence of standard operating 
procedures or orders assigning lower 
units to learn from experience/conduct 
LL-processes. 
c) The unit collects learned 
lessons from own, lower 
units. 
1. Existence of cross-level meetings 
within own hierarchy related to 
lessons learned. 
2. Use of forms or documents to report 
lessons to the unit. 
d) The unit collects learned 
lessons from other 
(external) units. 
 
1. Personnel visiting other 
units/seminars etc. to collect lessons. 
2. Presence and use of professional 
literature and magazines. 
2. Analysis of lessons a) The unit actively conducts 
analysis on collected 
experiences. 
b) The unit distinguishes 
between single and double-
loop lessons. 
 
1. Existence of resulting reports on 
lessons learned. 
2. Specific defined roles within the unit 
on the conduct of lessons learned 
analysis. 
3. Different processes related to different 
type of lessons (single and double-
loop). 
3. Storage of lessons a) The unit changes its 
organisational knowledge 
as a result of the 
experiences. 
1. The unit actively changes elements of 
DOTMLPF-I, within its own 
authority. 
b) The unit forwards lessons 
that it cannot implement 
itself to the higher level. 
2. Reports related to “double-loop” 
lessons, where the unit cannot change 
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the relevant element of DOTMLPF-I 
by itself. 
4. Dissemination of lessons a) The unit shares lessons it 
learned from experience. 
 
1. The unit publishes articles showing 
lessons. 
2. The unit organises or participates in 
seminars etc. 
3. Reports sent in to the unit’s higher 
level. 
Table 3-4: Operationalising the model 
 
3.4 Classification of the learning processes 
In the following chapters, the operationalised model is used to label the various phases of the 
learning processes within the Norwegian Army, related to operations and exercises. Each 
variable is “scored” for each level within the organisation, thus filling Table 3-3. Three 
classifications are defined to grade the used variables, and to label each phase in the process: 
• Low: there is no lessons learned process in place within the respective phase. 
• Medium: there is a unit-level lessons learned process in place, but is has not been 
formalised within the unit’s standard operating procedures or other steering 
documents. 
• High: there is a formal, unit-level lessons learned process in place. 
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4. Afghanistan 2005-2012 
The aim of this chapter is to identify and analyse the lessons learned processes as they were in 
place during the deployment of units of the Norwegian Army’s to Afghanistan in the recent 
past. First, it gives an overview of previous research related to lessons learned processes 
within the Norwegian Armed Forces. Second, it shows the chain of command as it was in use 
during operations abroad, visualising the importance of that chain in relation to learning 
processes. After the analysis of the development of the organisation-wide lessons learned 
procedures within the Armed Forces and the Army, the chapter describes the actual processes 
for each level within the Army. The chapter ends with sub conclusions. 
4.1 Overview of previous research 
Chapter one states that a lot of research has been conducted on learning from experience 
within the Norwegian Armed Forces during the last decade(s). In Figure 4-1 that research is 
visualised, distinguishing between the various levels within the Norwegian Armed Forces and  
showing the period each research covered. Research that was directly related to operations 
abroad is marked with pink ovals, while the unmarked research was conducted outside the 
scope of international operations. 
It can be concluded from the overview that most research related to operations abroad was 
conducted on the general level of the Armed Forces as a whole, on battalion and company 
level15 or on both. The latest research that covered the period in Afghanistan focuses on the 
period until 2012 (Svinndal, 2015). This chapter analyses therefore the Norwegian Army’s 
learning processes during the operations in Afghanistan in the period 2005-2012. 
 
                                               
15 During the operations in Afghanistan, the operational units were often not referred to as battalions or 
companies. It were however Norwegian units of battalion-size or smaller that were deployed. This research uses 
therefore the term battalion level to label the operational Norwegian units, deployed to Afghanistan.  
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Figure 4-1: Overview of previous research 
 
1. Isaksen, Kristiansen, & Møller, 2014 
2. Heintz, 2009 
3. Hennum et al., 2008 
4. Nesheim, 2016 
5. Hennum et al., 2010 
6. Haaland, 2016 
7. Kristiansen, 2009 
8. Erstad & Folkestad, 2016 
9. Norwegian Defense Staff, 2015 
10. Svinndal, 2015 
11. Weideman Eriksen, 2017 
 
4.2 The chain of command during operations 
Identifying the chain of command is essential in understanding how learning from experience 
happens or should happen: experience and identified lessons often need to be reported 
bottom-up through the formal line. The chain of command during operations or exercises is 
Legend 
 
NAF:   Norwegian Armed Forces 
NORA:  Norwegian Army 
LWC:   Land Warfare Centre 
BN:  Battalion 
COY:  Company 
 
Pink oval: Research 
related to international 
operations 
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different from the standing, peacetime one. Figure 4-2 shows both chains of command, in a 
strongly simplified version. 
During international operations like the ones the Norwegian Armed Forces participated in in 
Afghanistan, the Army composed and prepared the required operational units. Upon 
deployment to the operations area, those units were placed under command of the higher level 
within the area of operations, for example a regional NATO headquarters (in the figure 
depicted as “ISAF”16), while also residing under the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) in 
Bodø in a national command relationship. The Land Warfare Centre (LWC / TRADOK) 
supported the Army in preparing the units and in collecting, analysing and implementing 
lessons from the deployed units. The implication of this chain of command is that both the 
Army Command and Brigade North were in practice no part of the chain of command for 
their own units during the deployment of those units.  
 
Figure 4-2: Chain of Command - Peacetime versus Mission Conditions 
 
It is relevant to understand that this thesis only focuses on the learning processes in the 
Norwegian chain of command. In theory, the units should also have been participating in 
                                               
16 ISAF, or International Security Assistance Force, was a security mission conducted by a large coalition of 
forces from 2001 until 2014. Mandated by the United Nations, ISAF’s primary objective was to enable the 
Afghan Government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to 
ensure Afghanistan would never again become a safe haven for terrorists. As of August 11th, 2003, the mission 
was led by NATO (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm). 
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lessons learned processes within the chain of command of the operations area. In figure 4-2, 
ISAF should collect experiences from the Norwegian units as well, and those units should 
also disseminate learned lessons to ISAF. If and how this has occurred is not within the scope 
of this thesis. However, no indications were found that indicate ISAF actively collecting 
lessons from the Norwegian units. 
4.3 Development of the Army’s Lessons Learned Process 
This paragraph provides an overview of developments within the organisation-wide lessons 
learned procedures within the Norwegian Armed Forces and the Army in the period 2004 
until 2015. The overview focuses on two different periods. The first period, from 2004 until 
2012, is relevant because the developments in that timeframe influenced lessons learned 
processes during the operations in Afghanistan. The second period, from 2013 until 2015, is 
relevant for this thesis to understand what developments have taken place from the 
Afghanistan period until the start of the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018. 
Organisation-wide procedures from 2004 until 2012 
As a result of the 2004 White Paper (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 50), through a 
number of additional letters and directives, a centre for lessons learned was erected at the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters in 2005 (Hennum et al., 2008, p. 20). The centre became 
responsible for the collection and processing of experiences from international joint exercises 
and operations, a task the centre still has in 201917. In 2007 the first effects of the White Paper 
became visible within the Army as well when the Army Command ordered the predecessor of 
the Land Warfare Centre (the Transformasjons- og doktrine kommando, or TRADOK) to 
develop an own system for lessons learned, specifically for use within the Army (Norwegian 
Defence Staff, 2007 Appendix 3 to annex N, p. 8). First, TRADOK erected an own Section 
for Lessons Learned. From that moment on both the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and the 
TRADOK had a section with personnel dedicated to lessons learned processes. All reports 
from the Army’s tactical units should be send to the TRADOK’s Section for Lessons Learned 
(Norwegian Army Command, 2007, p. 4). It coordinated the analysis and implementation of 
lessons within various departments of TRADOK, and it described how lessons from training 
                                               
17 The Headquarter’s centre for lessons learned has been part of the Norwegian Defense University College for a 
short period of time. This did not infuence the development of the lessons learned process as described within 
this chapter. 
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and operations that were time-critical needed to be addressed in a swift manner within the 
Army. It did however not order the Army’s units to conduct their own lessons learned 
processes, nor did it describe how the units should disseminate their experiences to 
TRADOK. Guidelines were given, but a well-defined organisation-wide procedure did not 
come into place. In a report on lessons learned, dated 2008, it becomes clear that the section 
did use a significant amount of time and resources on lessons learned processes, collecting 
experiences, visiting operations and exercises and supporting the planning of future 
operations (Hærens transformasjons- og doktrinekommando, 2008, p. 5). 
Within the Army, no additional formal guidance on organisation-wide lessons learned 
processes can be found until 2012. In that year, the Army distributed Hærens utdannings- og 
treningsbestemmelser, or the Army’s Education and Training Directive. Its annex I (Lessons 
Learned) was a revised version of the 2007 edition (Norwegian Army Command, 2012). 
Hardly any changes were made, and within the Army that directive is still valid in 2019. 
In the same period, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters issued guidance on learning from 
experience as well (Norwegian Joint Headquarters, 2011). Core element of this guidance was 
that learning from experience was a responsibility of commanders throughout the chain of 
command. Furthermore, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters’ central role regarding lessons 
learned within the Armed Forces was reconfirmed. Again, the level of detail was quite 
limited, and well-defined organisation-wide lessons learned procedures were not 
implemented. 
It can be concluded that within the Army, no organisation-wide lessons learned procedure was 
present in the period from 2005 until 2012, nor did the Norwegian Joint Headquarters provide 
detailed directions. However, guidance was given on a case-by-case basis, in preparation to 
operations abroad and larger exercises. Examples are the D+40 and D+180 reports that units 
had to deliver during and after their deployment to international operations (Vie, J., interview, 
13 February 2019). 
Organisation-wide procedures between 2013 and 2015 
In 2013 the Chief of Defence issued own guidance on the Armed Forces organisation-wide 
lessons learned procedures (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2013). This time it was more detailed, 
ordering for example the Army (and other branches such as the Navy and the Air Force) to 
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dedicate personnel to support the operational lessons learned processes, to develop internal 
procedures adjusted to the own organisation and to make use of adequate means to support the 
processes, like databases and process management tools. Furthermore, it gave guidance 
regarding all phases of the learning process, from collection and analysis to storage and 
dissemination. 
The most recent guidance on organisation-wide procedures related to learning from 
experience was given by the Chief of Defence in 2015. Based on an internal revision 
(Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a), a few recommended measures were implemented. One of 
the recommendations was not implemented though: to update the Armed Forces’ 2013 system 
for lessons learned. Main focus of the revision’s implementation seems to be to leave the 
Army and the other branches as much freedom as possible to organise their own procedures18. 
4.4 Lessons learned processes in practice 
This paragraph compares the conclusions found in relevant previous research related to the 
actual lessons learned processes during deployment. Each level within the command structure 
is analysed, starting at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. Each subparagraph concludes with 
labelling the processes within the different phases of the learning process, by using the 
classifications as defined in paragraph 3.4. 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters 
This thesis focuses on learning from experience within the Army. The level above the Army, 
the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (ref. Figure 4-2), is relevant in cases where processes 
within the Headquarters influence those of the Army. Within the four phases of the learning 
process, it is in collection and storage of experiences that the higher level has direct 
interaction with its lower level: it collects experiences from that lower level, and the 
implementation of identified lessons can directly impact the level below. The phases of 
analysis and dissemination do not require the involvement of that lower level. The influence 
the Norwegian Joint Headquarters had on both the Army as a whole and on the Army’s 
subunits is therefore very relevant.  
                                               
18 One example is the wish of the Chief of Defense not to implement a recommended measure because he did not 
want to “micromanage” the branches (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015b, p. 3). 
Afghanistan 2005-2012 
 
 
  
 
 
35 
However, in practice the influence the Headquarters had on the Army as a whole was very 
limited. It could for example not direct the Army to implement a specific lessons learned 
procedure: it simply did not have the authority to do so (Nesheim, 2016, p. 35). Even if it 
would have developed more differentiated, context-dependent and refined systems for 
learning at the organisational level, as Weideman Eriksen suggests (2017, p. 16), it could not 
have forcefully implemented those systems within the Army. Furthermore, the Headquarters 
was not or to a very limited extent authorised to implement changes within the Army as a 
result of identified lessons from the operations areas abroad (Hennum et al., 2008, p. 23). This 
means that even if the Norwegian Joint Headquarters would have had effectively working, 
formal processes in use to implement change as a result of identified lessons, it would not 
have been authorised to do so directly within the Army. 
The influence the Headquarters had on the Army’s units during their deployment to 
international operations was larger, because the units formally resided under the Headquarters 
during deployment (ref. figure 4-2). The Headquarters tasked units to produce D+40 and 
D+180 reports19, which were collected both by the Headquarters and by the Land Warfare 
Centre. Those reports were the only formal means of written experience-sharing within the 
Armed Forces during operations in Afghanistan, which meant that a lot of information and 
lessons could have been lost, since they were not written down continually (Svinndal, 2015, p. 
61). However, the D+40 and D+180 reports were part of a process that was described in a 
formal manner. Seen from that perspective, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters did have 
formal processes in use during the phase of collection. 
Although the Norwegian Joint Headquarters did have influence on deployed units, the 
effectivity of the learning processes seemed to be low. Weideman Eriksen described that 
archiving [unit-level] lessons at the level of the Headquarters, such as in the database program 
FERDABALL, seems to have had limited added value (2017, p. 15). Moreover, Hennum et 
al. state that although the overall system for collecting and processing single reports was fine, 
the Armed Forces struggled when multiple reports had to be compared and analysed in a 
systemic manner over time (2010, p. 31/7). Even the level above the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters, the Defence Staff, states that it experienced on a daily basis important lessons 
                                               
19 The D refers to the first day of the deployment. The D+40 report is produced after being in theatre for 40 days, 
and the D+180 report after 180 days of the start of the deployment. 
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that did not fit in the system for lessons learned that was present at that time (Norwegian 
Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 16). 
It can thus be concluded that the Norwegian Joint Headquarters’ influence on the Army as a 
whole was limited. Its influence on deployed units of battalion level and lower was stronger, 
especially when it came to the collection of their experiences during the deployment.  
Norwegian Army Command 
The Norwegian Army Command’s role is twofold when it comes to learning from experience 
within the Army. On the one hand, being the highest level within the Norwegian Army, it is 
responsible to direct its units to implement a lessons learned system or process. On the other 
hand, it is part of those processes itself, where it should collect, analyse, store and disseminate 
lessons from itself and its lower units. 
It was not before 2007 that the Army Command issued guidance on the development of an 
organisation-wide lessons learned procedure within the Army, which was adjusted marginally 
in 2012. Before that period, there was no institution present that could collect and analyse 
experiences from operations abroad (Heintz, 2009, p. 67). According to Heintz (2009, p. 60), 
soldiers returning from missions abroad did not experience a systematic lessons learned 
process within the Army. Even after the directions given in 2007 and 2012, an internal 
revision of learning from experience within the Armed Forces showed that the guidelines 
within the Army were perceived to be not specific and practical enough for use throughout the 
whole chain of command (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 27). The system that was 
present did not describe for example that everybody within the Army was responsible to make 
sure that the Armed Forces could make good use of the experiences people gained (Bonnevie-
Svendsen in Svinndal, 2015, p. 49). Thus, the Army Command did not or very limitedly 
implement a usable and sufficiently detailed organisation-wide lessons learned procedure 
within the Army. 
The second role of the Army Command is its own role within the lessons learned processes in 
the Army. From the studied research it appears that the Army Command was not or to a very 
limited extent involved in the lessons learned  processes (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 
26). It was predominantly the Land Warfare Centre that was in the lead, with little 
involvement from the rest of the Army (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 26). Erstad & 
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Folkestad concluded that experiences that required material investments were generally easier 
to implement during operations than during peacetime conditions (2016, p. 48). That would 
imply that the role of the Army Command is even more important during operations, since 
material investments determine to a large extent the Army’s future. 
It can be concluded that the Norwegian Army Command did not have a formal role in any of 
the phases of the lessons learned processes related to the operations in Afghanistan. Evidence 
of the involvement of the Army Command in a more informal way has not been found in the 
researched literature as well. All phases in the learning process are therefore labelled as low. 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC L L L L 
 
Brigade North 
Although Brigade North is part of the Army’s command structure, neither in previous 
research nor in documents on formal guidance and direction, any indication or proof was 
found on Brigade North’s involvement in lessons learned processes related to the deployment 
of Army units to Afghanistan. The processes in all phases are therefore labelled as low. 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
BDE N L L L L 
 
The battalion level 
In the period 2005 until 2012 a lot of different units were deployed to Afghanistan. They 
differ with respect to the organic unit they belonged to, to the unit’s size during the 
deployment and to the set of tasks they had to execute. However, it is possible to distinguish a 
number of general observations from previous research. 
The most distinct observation is that the lessons learned processes differed in between the 
various units (Erstad & Folkestad, 2016, p. 35; Hennum et al., 2010, p. 31/8; Nesheim, 2016, 
p. 48). Learning did take place, especially internally and from one unit’s deployment to the 
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next. Units often conducted internal evaluation processes and after action reviews after 
operations during the mission (Hennum et al., 2010, p. 31/8; Nesheim, 2016, p. 37). Although 
Erstad & Folkestad (2016, p. 35) state that this variation can lead to a lack of interchange of 
experience in between Army units, the head of the Section for Lessons Learned at TRADOK 
comments that it was crucial that the local units implemented their own procedures for 
developing experience-based learning for learning to take place (Alvsaker in Kristiansen, 
2009, p. 42). Furthermore, he stated that the overall guidelines for learning from experience 
could only become usable if they were of practical use to the units (ibid. 2009, p. 43). The fact 
that different units used different lessons learned processes can thus have had advantages, but 
it could also have led to problematic dissemination of learned lessons. Below, after examining 
the various phases of the learning process, the results of previous research are summarised. 
Collection of experience consists of multiple variables (ref. paragraph 3.3): collection of 
experiences of own personnel, inducing subunits to learn, collecting learned lessons from 
subunits and collecting learned lessons from other units. The first variant took place 
frequently, for example through the after action reviews after specific actions, evaluations, 
weekly debriefings etc. (Hennum et al., 2010, p. 31/8; Nesheim, 2016, pp. 37, 40; Weideman 
Eriksen, 2017, p. 9). From the investigated documents, it did not become clear whether units 
also induced their subunits to conduct learning processes, or whether lessons from own 
subunits were collected. Units did however use a lot of effort to collect lessons from a specific 
type of “other unit”: the unit that was previously deployed to Afghanistan (Weideman 
Eriksen, 2017, p. 9). Often, this collection took place through informal networks (Nesheim, 
2016, p. 38). In a formal sense, it was much harder to obtain learned lessons from previous 
units, and the reports stored in FERDABALL were almost never used for that goal (Heintz, 
2009, p. 49). 
Since a large number of processes occurred with regard to collection, and those processes 
were there in general on purpose, the collection of experience is labelled as high. 
In the reviewed research, the difference between the phases of analysis and storage could not 
be found distinctly. It is therefore not possible to qualify those phases separately. It is 
however possible to analyse their results: the changes units made to DOTMLPF-I-elements 
and reports on lessons that the unit could not implement itself due to a lack of authority. 
According to Nesheim  (2016, p. 46), learning did take place within the fields of manoeuvre, 
firepower, survivability, equipment and personnel. Svinndal (2015, p. 38) confirms this, 
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stating that the officers within the Army took their responsibility and came up with proposals 
for improvement [during operations], especially with respect to operational technics  and 
combat drills. Weideman Eriksen (2017, p. 12) shows that units considered reflection, 
discussion and improvement of awareness of experiences as crucial to learn and become 
better at theirs tasks. Finally, Haaland (2016, p. 1010) describes that the Norwegian 
Provincial Reconstruction Team improved significantly in the period 2007 until 2009 
regarding the execution of operations at the tactical and technical levels, due to experiences in 
the beginning of that period. It cannot be distilled from previous research if units were 
distinguishing between lessons that were solvable on their own level and lessons that needed 
to be send to the higher level for further analysis and implementation. 
Since learning took place within the units and in between them, processes supporting the 
analysis and storage of experiences must have been present. No proof has been found on such 
processes taking place in a formal, purposely way. Therefore, it will be labelled as medium. 
The dissemination of learned lessons from units in Afghanistan to the rest of the organisation 
is quite ambiguous. On the one hand a formal procedure containing various types of reports 
did exist. After the end of the preparation period, and after 40 and 180 days after the start of 
the deployment, units had to send a report to the Norwegian Headquarters (Hennum et al., 
2008, p. 23). Moreover, the Land Warfare Centre conducted interviews with personnel during 
their redeployment from missions in order to collect lessons (Norwegian Defence Staff, 
2015a, p. 20). Those reports were strictly timed, which meant that experiences sent in using 
those reports were often already quite old by the time they had to be sent in. Their usability 
had degraded as a result of that (Nesheim, 2016, p. 48), something concluded by Svinndal as 
well (2015, p. 39). Furthermore, for those who wrote the reports it was often unclear what 
would happen with those lessons (Svinndal, 2015, p. 40). On the other hand, learned lessons 
were disseminated in an informal manner (Erstad & Folkestad, 2016, p. 37; Haaland, 2016, p. 
1018; Heintz, 2009, p. 49). The small size of the Army did allow for easy informal exchange 
of lessons (Nesheim, 2016, p. 38). However, Isaksen et al. (2014, p. 45) point at the risk that 
as personal experiences were shared in an informal way with the next contingent, those 
experiences often were not thoroughly analysed by the organisation. This, too, degraded their 
usability, something Erstad and Folkestad confirmed as well (2016, p. 37). Finally, not all 
lessons were shareable due to a too high security classification (Svinndal, 2015, p. 46). 
Afghanistan 2005-2012 
 
 
  
 
 
40 
Although relevant criticism is to be found in previous research on how formal dissemination 
of learned lessons took place, formal processes were definitely in place and executed as 
planned. It will therefore be labelled as high. 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
BN Level H M M H 
 
The Land Warfare Centre 
The predecessor of the Land Warfare Centre, the TRADOK, was not tasked to conduct 
lessons learned processes within the Army before 2007. After that, the TRADOK was 
reorganised into the Land Warfare Centre. This reorganisation influenced the work related to 
lessons learned processes negatively (Heintz, 2009, p. 59). In 2014 and 2015, the people 
working in the Section for Lessons Learned (SLL) were re-tasked, due to other priorities 
(Nesheim, 2016, p. 26). That period falls outside the scope of this chapter, but it does show 
that the tasks of the SLL were not always valued as the highest priority within the Land 
Warfare Centre. 
The Land Warfare Centre used various means to collect experiences from operations abroad. 
It collected the reports sent to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, it conducted interviews with 
people redeploying from operations (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 20) and it evaluated 
specific events. The evaluation of the operation Harekate Yolo II in 2007 is a good example 
of that (Haaland, 2016, p. 1006). It collected experiences both actively and passively 
(Norwegian Army Command, 2012, pp. I–3), and it collected lessons learned from operations 
outside Norway, such as the war in Georgia and a battle of French forces in Afghanistan in 
2008 (Hærens transformasjons- og doktrinekommando, 2008, p. 4). Furthermore, it organised 
specific seminars on executed operations, an example of which is the seminar on Operation 
Tufan, 13 March 2011 (Haaland, 2016, p. 1008). Finally, it collected thematic lessons, such as 
on countering improvised explosive devices and on local treatment of shot wounds (Isaksen et 
al., 2014, p. 78). 
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Collection of experience within the Land Warfare Centre consisted of numerous processes 
that were there on purpose and described in a formal way. This phase of the learning process 
is therefore labelled as high. 
The fact that within the Land Warfare Centre expertise within all relevant functional areas 
was present20 made it the ideal institution for the analysis of experiences during operations. 
Kristiansen (2009, p. 42) criticises that model, arguing that central analysis demands a lot of 
resources while decentral analysis is also crucial. In certain periods the Land Warfare Centre 
could not make up for that strong demand for resources, neither in the right quantity nor in the 
right quality to be able to analyse experiences. This was confirmed by one of the former heads 
of the SLL, Mathisen, and by one of Afghanistan’s unit commanders, Gjerde, in 2015 
(Nesheim, 2016, p. 49). Furthermore, in order to be able to conduct a thorough analysis on 
experiences, it is also important to be able to compare previous experiences. Conducting the 
analysis centrally within the Land Warfare Centre would enable a comparison between 
several different units and over a longer period of time. A well-working system, or database, 
would be required to be able to do so. In the period this thesis covers, the Armed Forces used 
FERDABALL as supportive tool for lessons learned. However, that system was hardly ever 
used in the preparation to missions (Heintz, 2009, p. 50), and it was even called “Big Black 
Hole” by those involved (Bonnevie-Svendsen in Svinndal, 2015, p. 39). The poor usability of 
FERDABALL has limited the possibilities to compare previously identified lessons with new 
ones significantly. 
Although the role of the Land Warfare Centre with regard to analysis of experiences was 
described in a formal way, in practice such processes were absent frequently, both due to a 
lack of capacity and usable supporting tools. Since it did occur occasionally and in a formal 
way, this phase is labelled as high. 
The Land Warfare Centre was the right institution when it comes to the storage of many of the 
DOTMLPF-I elements. It was overall responsible for exercises and training within the Army, 
including providing support to units in preparation of their missions. It managed the 
production of normative documentation and it supported the future development of the Army 
as a whole. The processing and follow-up of the implementation of external measures was 
                                               
20 The Land Warfare Centre incorporates schools on different specialties within the Army, like signals, 
manoeuvre, firepower, winter warfare etc. The heads of those schools are the Amry’s chief advisors on their 
respective functional specialties. 
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complicated (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 20). Within the Land Warfare Centre, the 
Section for Lessons Learned was placed relatively low in the hierarchy. Implementing change 
from that section was therefore not always possible due to a lack of authority (Hærens 
transformasjons- og doktrinekommando, 2008, p. 5). 
With regard to storage of identified lessons the Land Warfare Centre had formal processes in 
place that were followed in case of sufficient authority. This phase is therefore labelled as 
high too. 
One could argue that, looking at the tasks of the institution, the phase of dissemination was 
relatively meagre for the Land Warfare Centre: as long as it implemented the relevant lessons 
into training and exercises and into changes of normative documentation and as long as it 
incorporated those lessons in the development of the army of the future, no further 
dissemination was possible inside the own organisation of the Army. In that case, any 
dissemination would have been focused on for example spreading lessons to the Norwegian 
Joint Headquarters, to foreign armies and other, external institutions. Previous research did 
not give clear answers on how the Land Warfare Centre conducted dissemination of learned 
lessons. However, following the reasoning above, it is less relevant for this thesis. This phase 
in the learning process is therefore labelled as non-applicable.  
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
LWC  H H H N/A 
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4.5 Sub conclusions 
A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. In the first place, relatively much research 
has been done on the learning capacity of deployed units and of the Armed Forces as a whole 
during the operations in Afghanistan. The research hardly ever showed evidence of the Army 
Command or Brigade North having a role in those learning processes. Although the chain of 
command during operations shows that those two levels are not part of the command 
structure, that does not mean that they had no role in the lessons learned processes. One 
would especially expect a larger role for the Army Command, being the highest level within 
the Army with important tasks related to for example the acquisition of new material and the 
development of the Army into the future. 
A second conclusion is that despite the strong focus on learning processes, both within the 
Army and the Armed Forces as a whole, no significant formal changes or improvements to 
the Army’s organisation-wide lessons learned procedures were made in the researched period. 
Hardly any additional formal guidelines were given within the Army in the period 2007-2012. 
In practice, there was no organisation-wide lessons learned process detailed enough to direct 
or guide the Army’s units to develop their own processes. However, case-by-case guidance 
was given by the National Joint Headquarters, directing units to report after 40 and 180 after 
the start of their deployment. Although that system of reporting did receive criticism, it did 
form a to the situation adjusted procedure on learning from experience that was conducted as 
it was meant. 
The third conclusion is that within the Land Warfare Centre, the learning processes are 
labelled high in all phases. An explanation is the fact that within the Land Warfare Centre, a 
special section dealing with lessons learned processes is present. Having dedicated personnel 
does seem to stimulate lessons learned processes to be executed, although those persons were 
not always used for those processes, but also for other tasks. It must be stressed, however, that 
the Land Warfare Centre was only to a limited extent able to compare previous lessons with 
new ones. The lack of a usable supporting system to conduct that comparison seems to have 
caused this problem. 
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The analysis in this chapter has led to the following labelling of the phases in the learning 
process: 
 
It must be stressed that the labelling of the processes only applies to learning related to the 
operations in Afghanistan. The fact that the labelling of those processes within both the Army 
Command and Brigade North is labelled low means that in this setting there were no or hardly 
any processes in use with respect to learning from the missions in Afghanistan.
                                               
21 See Annex B: Abbreviations 
Level21 
Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC  L L L L 
LWC  H H H N/A 
BDE N L L L L 
BN level H M M H 
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5. Trident Juncture 2018 
In this chapter, the lessons learned processes as they did or did not take place within the 
Norwegian Army force structure during and after Trident Juncture are analysed.  
First, the sources used for this chapter are briefly described. Second, the chain of command 
during the exercise is shown, followed by a description of the case-by-case guidance that was 
issued with respect to learning from Trident Juncture. Fourth, before ending the chapter with 
sub conclusions, the actual processes as they took place during and after the exercise are 
discussed. 
The analysis in this chapter uses various types of information. The bulk of the information is 
retrieved from interviews. Initially, using the author´s own position within the Norwegian 
Army Command, the Trident Juncture lessons learned point of contact within the Army 
Command was identified: Lieutenant Colonel Netland, working within the Army Command´s 
National Land Operation Centre. She stated who the point of contact at Brigade North was. At 
battalion level it is often the operations officer who is responsible for lessons learned 
processes within the battalion, and at company level it is usually the company commander. 
Finally, at the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, the top level within the operational chain of 
command, there is a section in place that is specifically responsible for lessons learned 
processes. All those persons were interviewed and their roles with regard to lessons learned 
processes were confirmed in the interview invitation as well as in the initial phase of the 
interview. 
A second source of information were documents that the interviewees introduced during the 
interviews. Those documents were retrieved and analysed to complement the interview 
transcriptions. Finally, the author conducted his own research, predominantly on the Armed 
Forces’ intranet system (FIS B Begrenset), that led to relevant additional documents. 
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5.1 Trident Juncture’s chain of command 
During the preparation and execution of an exercise two chains of command can often be 
identified: the organic one, consisting of the peacetime establishment of the military units and 
the exercise scenario chain of command, consisting of the units that “fight” on one of the 
sides within the exercise scenario. 
Lessons resulting from an exercise need to be addressed in both chains of command. They can 
have different scopes, objectives and contents, depending on the chain of command the 
identified lessons needs to address.  
In figure 5-1 we see a simplified scheme of the organic chain of command of the Norwegian 
Army on the left side. On the right side, Trident Juncture’s chain of command is shown, also 
in a simplified version. The Norwegian units that participated are depicted in orange, whereas 
the yellow units were formed by other nations. 
 
Figure 5-1 Chain of Command, simplified (Norwegian Army Command, 2017 Vedlegg A, 2018b) 
 
The Army Command is not included in the Trident Juncture scenario. It remained conducting 
its peacetime operations as usual. Brigade North as a whole was placed under command of 
Land Component Command North (LCC-N) which was formed by NATO’s Land Command 
from Izmir, Turkey. The Telemark Battalion (TMBN) was placed under command of the Very 
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High Readiness Joint Task Force Brigade (VJTF Brigade) led by a German brigade 
headquarters with augmentees from the participating NATO countries. 
The implications of those multiple chains of command for the lessons learned processes are 
especially relevant in the analysis phase: there, for every experience that is analysed, it must 
be determined whether that lesson is relevant for the peacetime chain of command, the 
exercise scenario chain of command or both. If that distinction is not made, valuable lessons 
could be sent to the wrong recipient or the right recipient might not receive the valuable 
lessons at all. Within this research only the peacetime chain of command is examined, since 
the focus is solely on the lessons learned processes within the Norwegian Army. 
5.2 Guidelines introduced for Trident Juncture 
In chapter three, it was stated that the Army cannot just rely on its “natural” or informal 
processes of learning, but that it must deliberately use routines to capture the changes in the 
individual members´ mental models and incorporate those into its shared mental models. 
Furthermore, as stated in the introduction, it is to be expected that Trident Juncture 2018, 
being one of the largest NATO-exercises since the end of the Cold War, triggered the Army to 
implement a robust lessons learned procedure in order to capture, analyse and process all its 
relevant experiences. This paragraph analyses what case-by-case guidance was given through 
the organic chain of command, from the National Joint Headquarters in Bodø down to the 
battalion level. 
At the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, a distinction was made between two parts of the 
exercise: the Field Training Exercise, conducted in accordance with the force structure, and 
the Command Post Exercise, conducted by headquarters without having troops actually 
conducting actions “in the field”. This research focuses on the field training exercise, since 
that part included the troops relevant in this thesis. 
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With respect to this part of Trident Juncture, the National Joint Headquarters ordered its 
subunits, including the Army, to (Norwegian Joint Headquarters, 2018): 
– Implement an internal system to guarantee taking care of experiences from planning 
and execution of the exercise. The Army should actively register its experiences; 
– Point out a lessons learned Officer with Primary Responsibility, who would: 
– Be point of contact to NJHQ’s Section for Operational Experiences; 
– Collect observations from own and subordinate units; 
– Organise and conduct an analysis on those observations; 
– Collect and process the First Impression Reports from subordinate units; 
– Lead the work on producing the unit’s own First Impression Report and 
send it to NJHQ within the expected deadline. 
– Conduct an After Action Review at the end of the exercise. This will lay the 
foundations for the unit’s First Impression Report. 
 
Finally, the headquarters stressed that it was important to monitor the various lessons 
identified, both by themselves as by the tactical units. Each unit should develop its own 
Lessons Identified Action List, a list that would not only show the various lessons that have 
been identified, but also the responsible actor for the implementation of any measures that are 
recommended to be implemented. 
At the level of the Army Command, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters’ instructions were 
processed in an own order to the Norwegian Army’s subunits (Norwegian Army Command, 
2018a). That order appointed the officer with primary responsibility within the Army and it 
ordered Brigade North to: 
– Register lessons and observations during the exercise; 
– Conduct an After Action Review and produce and deliver a First Impression Report; 
– Be prepared to participate in a lessons learned working group after the end of the 
exercise. 
 
The order provided the units with mandatory formats for a First Impression Report and a 
Lessons Identified List. 
Residing below the level of the Army Command is Brigade North. The brigade did not 
include any case-by-case guidelines on learning from experience in the relevant orders for the 
exercise (Brigade Nord, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). The interviewed representatives from the 
Telemark Battalion and the Second Battalion both confirmed that their unit had not received 
any additional guidelines on learning from experience from Trident Juncture, nor that they 
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had given specific additional guidelines themselves in preparation to the exercise, neither to 
their own level nor to their subunits (Reinaas, B. and Skjærbæk, H.M.S., interview, 13 
February 2019; Stormo, S., interview, 7 February 2019). 
It can thus be concluded that within the Army’s force structure, only the Army Command 
issued case-by-case guidelines on learning from the experiences Trident Juncture would 
bring. Brigade North and the battalions did not follow that example. That does not necessarily 
mean that learning processes did not took place at all. The following paragraph analyses what 
processes occurred within and between the Norwegian Army’s levels in practice. 
5.3 Actual lessons learned processes in use 
This paragraph primarily displays and discusses the results of the interviews with 
representatives from the different units, supplemented by additional analysis of relevant 
documents as stated. Each subparagraph concludes with labelling of the processes within the 
different phases of the learning process, using the classifications as defined in paragraph 3.4. 
Norwegian Army Command22 
Within the Army Command, the G7 (the head of the office responsible for training, education 
and exercise) is responsible for lessons learned processes throughout the army. Although in 
normal peacetime conditions the Army Command does not have any unit-level lessons 
learned procedures in place, the Army’s G7 did write an order issuing case-by-case guidance 
on how learning from experience regarding Trident Juncture had to be conducted (Norwegian 
Army Command, 2018a). It was a formal document focussing predominantly on roles and 
responsibilities and on how the Army Command should collect identified lessons from its 
subunits. Furthermore, it provided mandatory formats on reporting the identified lessons. The 
formal role of the G7 as lessons learned officer with primary responsibility was then 
delegated to the head of the Norwegian Land Operation Centre, since the G7 himself was 
assigned a specific role within the exercise organisation that could not be combined with other 
roles. 
                                               
22 This pargraph is based on an order, written by the Army Command on learning lessons from Trident Juncture 
(Norwegian Army Command, 2018a), and on an interview with the head of the Norwegian Land Operation 
Centre (Netland, K.S., 8 February 2019). 
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In the Norwegian Land Operation Centre, the operational part of the Army Command, 
internal procedures were agreed upon to collect relevant lessons from own personnel. The 
centre also collected lessons from other, comparable units such as the operations rooms of the 
Norwegian Cyber Defence Force, the National Reserve and the National Air Operations 
Centre in Bodø, often by visiting those units. 
After collection of the lessons was finished by the end of January 2019 they were analysed. 
The Army’s subunits were invited to a workshop Lessons Identified within the Norwegian 
Army (arbeidsmøte LI i Hæren). There, the various lessons were analysed and it was defined 
whether or not each lesson could be implemented using own measures or not. The most 
important lessons were imported in the Norwegian Army’s First Impression Report that was 
sent to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters at a later stage. 
The Operations Centre’s main procedure to disseminate its learned lessons was by sharing 
them during the visits to other operations rooms. 
Conclusion is that apart from dissemination the Army Command had formal procedures in 
place in all phases of the learning process, some of them stated in an order, other decided on 
or refined in a later stage. Furthermore, those procedures were executed in relative short time 
after the exercise. Since this thesis does not aim at examining the end-result of the processes, 
but merely the purposely existence of them, the following subconclusion is made: 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC H H H M 
 
One important remark must be made: the described procedures and processes did take place 
as a direct consequence of Trident Juncture 2018. It is uncertain whether or not such 
procedures and processes are sufficiently in place during regular peacetime conditions as well. 
However, from relevant documents (Norwegian Army Command, 2018a; Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters, 2018) and various interviews (Halvorsen, T.A., interview, 31 January 2019; 
Netland, K.S., interview, 8 February 2019), it becomes clear that the Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters has had a strong influence by pushing the Army Command to appoint a lessons 
learned officer with primary responsibility, to deliver a First Impression Report and to be 
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present at various lessons learned meetings and seminars. It is likely that this has had a 
positive effect on the Army Command’s lessons learned processes regarding Trident Juncture, 
although it is uncertain whether those process would have been equally high under a situation 
in which the Army Command had not received case-by-case guidance from its higher level. 
Brigade North  
Brigade North did not issue any additional guidance related to lessons learned processes for 
Trident Juncture, neither for its own staff personnel or for its subunits, what was confirmed by 
studying the relevant documents (Brigade Nord, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) and the interviews 
with the brigade representative and the interviewees from the battalion level23. According to 
the brigade representative the brigade does not have any unit-level lessons learned procedures, 
outside the scope of the exercise and it does not formally induce its own personnel or its 
subunits to learn from experience. One exception is the current Virksomhetsordre 2019 or 
yearly business plan. There, the brigade’s subunits are ordered to produce a First Impression 
Report and a Final Exercise Report after every brigade-led exercise. 
Since none of the available documents give any detailed guidelines on lessons learned 
processes within Brigade North, the rest of this paragraph is based on the interview with the 
brigade representative.  
One way in which Brigade North actively collected experiences is the conduct of a hot wash-
up during one of the last days of an exercise and a Post Exercise Discussion between the 
brigade commander and his/her subordinate commanders, some weeks after every major 
exercise. There were no transcriptions or reports made during those two types of meetings. 
Another example of such a meeting is the recently organized Tactical Seminar (January 
2019). That seminar focused on the preparation of the next major exercise by discussing 
various relevant themes. Those themes will likely have been chosen as a result of the 
exercise’s hot wash-up or Post Exercise Discussion, but that could not be confirmed during 
the interviews or document analysis. 
                                               
23 Krogstad, R., interview, 30 January 2019; Reinaas, B. and Skjærbæk, H.M.S., interview, 13 February 2019; 
Stormo, S., interview, 7 February 2019 
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The brigade does not have formal procedures in place to learn from other, comparable units. It 
does cooperate with different nations and other units, though, and learning does occur as a 
result of that cooperation. 
Since there are relatively little processes in place to actively collect lessons internally, from 
subunits or from comparable types of units, the phase of collection is labelled low. Some 
processes do occur, but whether those will lead to learning is uncertain. 
If valuable lessons are collected, the brigade does have a process to analyse them. Where 
applicable, the relevant section within the brigade headquarters conducts that analysis. If an 
integral analysis is required, the chief of staff forms a special working group that addresses 
the lesson. If it can be implemented within the brigade’s own authority, e.g. changing its 
standard operating procedures, that will be done. Otherwise, the identified lesson will be 
forwarded within the organic chain of command. Although this process is not formally 
described, it does take place, leading to medium labels for both analysis and storage of 
lessons. Important remark is that the brigade’s standard operating procedures are kept up-to-
date this way. The author experienced this himself when a Dutch brigade headquarters, 
comparable to Brigade North, requested to receive a copy of its standard operating 
procedures, because Brigade North was well-known for having up-to-date standard operating 
procedures. 
The brigade has no formal unit-level procedures to disseminate learned lessons to other, 
comparable units. If that happens, it is often coincidental. This can be explained by the fact 
that within the Norwegian Army no comparable unit exist to share learned lessons with. 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
BDE N L M M L 
 
An interesting note is that the brigade did execute the formal guidelines it received from the 
Army Command in preparation to the exercise. Those guidelines were (ref. paragraph 5.2): 
– Register lessons and observations during the exercise; 
– Conduct an After Action Review and produce and deliver a First Impression Report; 
– Be prepared to participate in a lessons learned working group after the end of the 
exercise. 
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The battalion level24 
Two of the in total eight Norwegian battalions within Brigade North that participated in the 
exercise have been examined: the Second Battalion and the Telemark Battalion. Both 
confirmed that they had not been asked or ordered by Brigade North to conduct a lessons 
learned process during or after Trident Juncture. They also did not have to send in a Lessons 
Identified List or a Final Exercise Report to the brigade. The Telemark Battalion did send in 
an evaluation report after the exercise, but that (appears to be) the result of their own 
initiative. 
When it comes to the collection of lessons, both battalions have their own procedures with 
many similarities. At one of the last days of every exercise, the battalions conduct a hot wash-
up with their own staff and its subunits. After some days, an evaluation meeting or Post 
Exercise Discussion, is organised to discuss experiences. Both units also organise seminars to 
discuss and analyse identified lessons within various themes on a frequent basis. Furthermore, 
they conduct exchange of personnel with other, comparable units in order to learn from their 
experiences and to import learned lessons into the own units. Because of the fact that both 
battalions use formal procedures for the collection of experiences, that phase in the learning 
process is labelled high. 
Systematic analysis of experiences and processing them into identified lessons is done 
differently between the units. Second Battalion conducts a quick analysis upon registering it 
within the unit’s internal lessons learned database (based on Microsoft OneNote). If direct 
remedial measures are required and feasible, those will be taken care of immediately. 
Otherwise, the lesson will be archived in the unit’s database for later reference. The Telemark 
Battalion conducts its analysis in a different way. There, together with support from the 
Army’s Land Warfare Centre, the analysis is made whether the unit has met its training 
objectives during the exercise or not. If not, that training objective will be registered to be 
trained again, during a future exercise. If a lesson needs other remedial measures, it is sent to 
the appropriate level within the Norwegian Army. 
Although analysis takes place within both battalions, it is not (specifically) focused on 
distinguishing between lessons that can be solved at the own level or not, nor on what factor 
                                               
24 This paragraph is based on interviews with representatives of both Second Battalion (Stormo, S., 7 February 
2019) and the Telemark Battalion (Reinaas, B. and Skjærbæk, H.M.S., 13 February 2019). 
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within the DOTMLPF-I framework a remedial action would be aimed. This means that the 
analysis is not “complete”: it does not answer the question on what would need to be changed 
to learn the specific lesson, and whether or not the own unit would be authorised to 
implement that change. Especially Second Battalion clearly states that is not or to a very 
limited extent possible to change its standard operating procedures as a result of identified 
lessons, since it does not have any. Analysis and storage are therefore labelled as medium. 
Dissemination of lessons learned from the battalions to other units has different priorities. 
With regard to this, the Telemark Battalion has a special responsibility. It is the only battalion 
without conscripts, consisting solely out of professional soldiers. Every year, the battalion 
commander issues an order where he/she expresses what the unit should do to spread lessons 
learned to other parts of the Norwegian Army. Second Battalion does not have a comparable 
focus and does not have specific guidelines on how to disseminate learned lessons. 
Dissemination at the battalion level is therefore labelled as medium. 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
BN Level H M M M 
 
The Land Warfare Centre25 
The Land Warfare Centre forms a separate entity within the Army’s chain of command. It is 
overall responsible for (supporting) exercises and training within the Army, for the production 
of normative documentation and for (supporting) the future development of the Army as a 
whole. It is not an operational (combat) unit. However, if it is to support the future 
development of the Army, the lessons learned processes within the Army are very relevant for 
the Land Warfare Centre.  
  
                                               
25 This paragraph is based on the interview with the head of Land Warfare Centre’s Section for Lessons Learned 
(Vie, J., interview, 13 February 2019). 
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In order to support those lessons learned processes, the centre has an own Seksjon for 
erfaringslæring or Section Lessons Learned. It consists of two persons, and its roles are to: 
– Support the systematic collection of lessons identified within the Norwegian Army; 	
– Support the various schools within the Land Warfare Centre with regard to the 
collection and analysis of lessons; 	
– Improve and/or develop a formal organisation-level lessons learned procedure within 
the Army.	
 
During Trident Juncture, the Section Lessons Learned was specifically assigned to conduct a 
lessons learned process on some aspects of the exercise that the Army (and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces) had not conducted earlier: developing and maintaining an organisation for 
Land Operations Control and executing Host Nation Support to all foreign land forces within 
the exercise. The specifics of those two tasks are less relevant within the scope of this thesis, 
but it is relevant that those tasks are no part of the Land Warfare Centre’s organic tasks. They 
were so exhaustive that in order to execute them, the centre was deployed to the exercise 
completely, and most staff personnel had to work in a different role than usual26. The second 
role of the Section for Lessons Learned was therefore exactly what it did during the exercise: 
supporting the whole of the centre with its lessons learned process. 
During and after Trident Juncture, in practice the Section for Lessons Learned consisted of 
merely one man: its section head. In that period, the section conducted a formal, pre-planned 
and organised lessons learned process. Collection did not only consist of requesting Lessons 
Identified Lists from participants, but also of giving briefings on how the process would look 
like, urging people to deliver high quality observations and conducting interviews with 
relevant players. The analysis did take single- and double loop learning into account, 
distinguishing between lessons that could be learned at the own level and lessons that needed 
a higher level to take action on. Storage meant direct implementation of measures during the 
exercise as well as storing lessons within the Land Warfare Centre’s internal system for use in 
preparation to future exercises. Dissemination also took place, especially to the Norwegian 
Joint Headquarters, but also internally within the Army. An example is a Trident Juncture 
Lessons Learned Seminar the centre organised on the 21st and 22nd of January 2019, where 
                                               
26 The author has this information from first hand, also being deployed as part of the Land Warfare Centre during 
Trident Juncture 2018. 
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interesting tactical lessons were shared and discussed with personnel from various parts of the 
Army27. This leads to the following classification of the phases of the learning process: 
 Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
LWC  H H H H 
 
During the interview with the head of the Section for Lessons Learned, it also became clear 
that this section uses significant resources to support the lessons learned processes for units 
before, during and after international deployments. The section studies three reports that each 
unit writes in relation to the deployment: one during the preparation phase 
(utdanningsreport), one report 40 days and one 180 days after the start of the deployment 
(D+40 and D+180 reports). The latter two are also used to prepare a Tactical Debrief, a 
conversation with personnel during their redeployment from a mission. The whole process 
focuses on identifying lessons related to the mission’s objectives, using the DOTMLPF-I 
framework. Those lessons are analysed on the spot, supported by selected subject matter 
experts. Identified lessons are implemented directly in the preparation of the next contingent, 
by sending a recommendation on changing the mission’s DOTMLPF-I factors to the Army 
Command. This procedure seems well-implemented and thoroughly executed. 
Other relevant remarks 
During most interviews, people initially did not recognise processes as related to learning 
from experience. The hot wash-up and Post Exercise Discussion were often mentioned as part 
of the lessons learned process, but the interviewer had to explain that visiting other units to 
discuss their experiences or organising internal thematic seminars can also be seen as part of 
the collection of experiences. At the time of the interview this explanation by the interviewer 
seemed not relevant and has unfortunately been removed from the transcripts. However, it 
does show that there seems to exist a lack of knowledge about lessons learned processes 
within the different parts of the Army. 
                                               
27 The author took part in that seminar. 
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One aspect of analysis that, according to the head of the Land Warfare Centre’s Section for 
Lessons Learned, is not conducted in a sufficiently structured way, is comparing new lessons 
identified with previous ones: 
…we do not have a “database-system” available that enables us to easily 
compare recent lessons identified with previous ones. It is not possible to 
effectively search for that in the current SharePoint environment that has 
integrated the FERDABALL database. However, this is an essential capability if 
you want to learn. A recent experience that does not look important can become 
important by just being recurrent. 
Vie, J., interview, 13 February 2019 
5.4 Sub conclusions 
The previous paragraph results in the following table: 
 
During and after Trident Juncture, both within the Army Command and the Land Warfare 
Centre, lessons learned processes were in place in all phases of the learning cycle and almost 
always on purpose. At the brigade level and below, in most phases of the learning cycle, 
processes were in place, but hardly ever in a formal manner, except for the collection of 
experiences at the battalion level. The differences in the processes between the Army 
Command and the Land Warfare Centre on the one side and the brigade and battalion level on 
the other side can have various causes. 
The first conclusion can be drawn from two observations. In the first place, within the Army 
Command a person was specifically assigned to act as an officer with primary responsibility 
with regards to lessons learned processes for this exercise. The personal commitment to the 
exercise’s lessons learned process seems to have had a strong influence on the Army 
Command’s priority it received. The other observation is that both in the Land Warfare Centre 
and at the level above the Army Command, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, personnel is 
Level 
Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC H H H M 
LWC H H H H 
BDE N L M M L 
BN level H M M M 
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working in a job dedicated to lessons learned processes. At the Land Warfare Centre, this has 
had a visible positive effect resulting in a label high within all phases of the process. It is very 
likely that the efforts conducted by the Joint Headquarters, both in written orders as in 
organising different meetings, will have worked as an additional incentive to the Army 
Command’s efforts. The conclusion is thus that having personnel dedicated to the lessons 
learned process, in a permanent position as well as being appointed on a case-by-case basis, 
strongly improves the lessons learned processes within that unit. 
The lack of formal processes at Brigade North and the battalion level does not have a clear 
cause. However, during the interviews the interviewer often had to give additional 
explanation on lessons learned processes. A lack of detailed knowledge on lessons learned 
processes could therefore be one of the reasons because of which the phases of analysis and 
storage at the levels of Brigade North and the battalion are not conducted in a more formal 
way. 
Finally, it can be concluded that both within the Land Warfare Centre and Brigade North, the 
guidelines on the conduct of the lessons learned process as given by the Army Command 
have been executed accordingly. Brigade North did not issue detailed case-by-case guidance 
to its own subunits. Formulating formal guidelines to subordinate units does seem to have 
motivated them to execute tasks with regard to lessons learned processes. 
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6. Comparing the cases 
After the analysis of the lessons learned processes during the operations in Afghanistan (2005 
until 2012) in chapter four and of those processes related to Trident Juncture in chapter five, 
this chapter aims at comparing the two cases. 
The three forms of lessons learned procedures are relevant here: organisation-wide 
procedures, unit-level procedures and case-by-case guidance28. Those three forms are all 
formal in nature: they are described in orders, standing operating procedures and/or other 
steering documents. Lessons learned processes can also occur in an informal manner. In that 
case, they occur without being described in one of those documents in advance. 
In the first paragraph, the organisation-wide lessons learned processes within the Army as 
they were in place in the two cases are compared. Then, a comparison is made of the actual 
conduct of lessons learned processes within each of the Army’s levels. The third paragraph 
discusses the differences and similarities, followed by an in-depth review of selected findings 
in the last paragraph. 
6.1 Comparison of the Army’s lessons learned processes 
This paragraph discusses whether or not the Army’s units were encouraged to formalise 
lessons learned procedures at the own level in general, outside the scope of Afghanistan or 
Trident Juncture, based on detailed guidance from its higher levels. 
In the period from 2005 until 2007, a number of relevant changes were made, including the 
erection of a Section for Lessons Learned within the predecessor of the Land Warfare Centre, 
the TRADOK. However, the Army’s units were not tasked to conduct their own lessons 
learned processes, nor was it described how the units should disseminate their experiences to 
the TRADOK. Some guidelines were given, but a well-defined process did not come into 
effect. An internal revision of learning from experience within the Armed Forces showed that 
the guidelines were perceived to be not specific and/or practical enough to be used throughout 
the chain of command (Norwegian Defence Staff, 2015a, p. 27). The same guidelines were 
confirmed, but not expanded or defined in a more detailed manner in the Education and 
Training Directive, issued by the Army in 2012 (Norwegian Army Command, 2012). In 2018, 
                                               
28 See paragraph 1.3 
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when Trident Juncture took place, that directive had not been updated, supplemented or 
replaced.  
It can be thus concluded that both during the Afghanistan operations from 2005 until 2012 
and during the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, the organisation-wide lessons learned 
procedures within the Army were very limited and not detailed enough for units to base their 
own lessons learned procedures on. 
6.2 The differences in practice 
This paragraph discusses the differences between the cases at each of the Army’s levels 
within its hierarchy. Below, the tables in the sub conclusions of chapters four and five are 
merged into one: 
Table 6-1: Comparing lessons learned processes 
In this table, the classification as described in paragraph 3.4 is used: 
• Low (L): there is no lessons learned process in place within the respective phase. 
• Medium (M): there is a unit-level lessons learned process in place, but is has not been 
formalised within the unit’s standard operating procedures or other steering 
documents. 
• High (H): there is a formal, unit-level lessons learned process in place. 
Level  
Phase within the process of learning 
Collection Analysis Storage Dissemination 
NAC 
Afghanistan L L L L 
Trident Juncture H H H M 
LWC 
Afghanistan H H H N/A 
Trident Juncture H H H H 
BDE N 
Afghanistan L L L L 
Trident Juncture L M M L 
BN level 
Afghanistan H M M H 
Trident Juncture H M M M 
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In order to actively learn from experiences, the Army would need Organisational Learning 
Mechanisms29. Those mechanisms should collect, analyse, store and disseminate lessons in a 
systematic way. In table 6-1, that would mean that all levels within all phases of the learning 
process would be labelled High. 
Norwegian Army Command 
Within the Norwegian Army Command, huge differences were found between the 
Afghanistan period and Trident Juncture. As table 6-1 shows, very limited proof was found of 
the Army Command’s involvement in formal or informal lessons learned processes related to 
the ongoing operations during the Afghanistan period. 
With respect to Trident Juncture, the Army Command did provide its subunits with detailed 
guidelines specifically related to the exercise. Moreover, it took part in those processes. 
Within all four phases of the learning process, the Army Command had formal procedures in 
place and it stimulated Brigade North to do so too. Furthermore, a lessons learned officer with 
primary responsibility was appointed. Here, the Norwegian Joint Headquarters had a strong 
influence, using the peacetime chain of command30 to order the Army Command to appoint a 
lessons learned officer with primary responsibility, to deliver a First Impression Report and to 
be present at various lessons learned meetings and seminars.  
Brigade North 
Within Brigade North, some differences were found between the cases. In the Afghanistan 
period, very limited proof was found on its involvement in lessons learned processes related 
to the ongoing operations. During Trident Juncture, Brigade North was involved in those 
processes, especially in the phases of analysis and storage, although predominantly in an 
informal manner. It did not or very limitedly stimulate its own subunits to conduct lessons 
learned processes, something Brigade North had received itself from its higher level. It 
appears that this stimulation from a higher level did not have the same effect on Brigade 
North as it had on the Army Command. An explanation for this has not been found. 
                                               
29 See paragraph 3.1 
30 See paragraph 5.1 
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The battalion level 
Table 6-1 shows that there were few differences between the Afghanistan period and Trident 
Juncture at the battalion level. In both cases, lessons learned processes were in place in a 
formal manner in the phase of collection and in an informal manner in the phases of analysis 
and storage. 
One difference between the cases was found in external stimulation. During the operations in 
Afghanistan, units were obliged to deliver reports to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters, after 
40 and 180 days after the first day of the deployment, which they did accordingly. Those 
reports had to include identified and/or learned lessons. Regarding Trident Juncture, the units 
did not receive any guidance on learning from experience from Brigade North. 
The Land Warfare Centre 
The Land Warfare Centre’s Section for Lessons Learned functioned as the Army’s central hub 
for lessons learned processes in both cases. It consisted of two persons (or: positions) 
dedicated to learning from experience. It was therefore to be expected that the centre’s lessons 
learned processes are categorised high in all phases of the learning process, both during the 
Afghanistan period and during Trident Juncture. Table 6-1 shows that this is correct for 
almost all phases, except possibly for dissemination of experiences during the operations in 
Afghanistan. Due to a lack of information during this research it was not possible to label that 
phase. 
The Land Warfare Centre conducted its task during the Afghanistan period in a more general 
way collecting, analysing and implementing lessons from the operations area. Regarding 
Trident Juncture, it was tasked to conduct a lessons learned process on pre-defined aspects of 
the exercise, something it conducted accordingly. Here, a specific order from the higher level 
was executed as is was meant: it focused the subunit on conducting a lessons learned process 
in a specified way, with defined objectives to be accomplished and procedures to be followed. 
One significant similarity in the cases is that the Land Warfare Centre did not have a system 
available to compare previously identified lessons with new ones. If an identified lesson for 
some reason was not implemented, it could not be saved in a systematic manner for future 
reference. Some lessons only become relevant for implementation if repetition occurs. In both 
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cases, there was no usable system to conduct such a comparison at the Land Warfare Centre’s 
disposal. 
6.3 Explaining differences and similarities 
In the comparison, the most significant difference emerged within the Norwegian Army 
Command: it hardly had any learning processes in place related to the operations in 
Afghanistan, while it had (predominantly) formal processes in place with respect to learning 
in Trident Juncture. A comparable, but less significant difference can be found within Brigade 
North: no proof of formal or informal lessons learned processes was found regarding the 
operations in Afghanistan, whereas there were (predominantly informal) processes in place as 
a result of the exercise Trident Juncture, especially within the phases of analysis and storage.  
The chain of command can explain this difference. During the operations in Afghanistan, 
neither the Norwegian Army Command nor Brigade North was part of the mission chain of 
command, explaining a lack of commitment to the lessons learned processes related to the 
operations in Afghanistan. However, during Trident Juncture the Army Command was no 
formal part of the exercise chain of command either, and Brigade North resided under a 
foreign unit (Land Component Command North). The Norwegian Joint Headquarters used the 
peacetime chain of command to give case-by-case guidance to the Army on how to conduct 
lessons learned processes related to the exercise. Something the Army Command on its turn 
ordered Brigade North and the Land Warfare Centre to do, too. For an unknown reason, 
Brigade North did not order its own subunits to conduct lessons learned processes during and 
after Trident Juncture. It shows however that choosing a specific chain of command to issue 
guidance on lessons learned processes will have a strong influence on the units that are 
involved in those processes. 
Four similarities were found in the comparison of the cases, which will be discussed below. 
The first similarity is that in both cases, case-by-case guidance on learning from experience 
was issued. During the operations in Afghanistan, the battalion level was ordered to deliver 
reports after 40 and 180 days, something that was conducted accordingly. Each deployment to 
that mission would receive an own, tailor-made order from the Norwegian Joint Headquarters. 
The Norwegian Army Command received detailed guidance on lessons learned processes 
during Trident Juncture, leading to the Army Command writing own detailed guidance for its 
Comparing the cases 
 
 
  
 
 
64 
own subunits. In that guidance the Land Warfare Centre was ordered to conduct a lessons 
learned process with specific aims, which it did accordingly. A possible explanation is that in 
both cases, existing organisation-wide lessons learned procedures were not sufficiently 
detailed for units to use. Thus, if learning from experience had to occur in an active manner, 
additional guidelines were required. Furthermore, both the operations in Afghanistan and the 
exercise Trident Juncture were seen as important enough to prioritise resources on issuing and 
executing case-by-case guidance to the various levels within the Army to conduct tailor-made 
lessons learned processes. Although for an unknown reason Brigade North did not follow that 
example and did not issue case-by-case guidance itself to its subunits, those specific case-by-
case guidelines appear to have been quite effective. 
The second similarity that was found is that in those units where the processes were labelled 
high in most or all phases, dedicated personnel related to lessons learned processes was part 
of the organisation. The most obvious example is the Land Warfare Centre, where in both 
cases the processes in almost all phases were in place in a formal manner. Another example is 
the Norwegian Army Command, in which during Trident Juncture an officer with primary 
responsibility was appointed. There, the processes were in place in a formal manner as well. 
Finally, although the Norwegian Joint Headquarters was not part of the analysis of this 
research, there is a separate section consisting of five positions dedicated to learning from 
experience, something that appeared to be very effective. The (rather obvious) explanation for 
this is that personnel that is dedicated to learning from experience within a unit is strongly 
motivated to expand their knowledge on lessons learned processes and to use a significant 
amount of effort in optimising them. 
A third similarity that was found is that comparing new lessons identified with previous ones 
was not conducted in a sufficiently structured way. The explanation is that in both cases no 
suitable system was available to support such analysis. In the Afghanistan period, 
FERDABALL was to be used while it was not fitted for that purpose. During Trident 
Juncture, there was no supporting database-system available at all.  
The final similarity was found at the battalion level in the phases of collection, analysis and 
storage. In both cases analysis and storage were labelled medium, while the phase of 
collection was labelled high. A clear explanation of this similarity was not found during this 
research. In the next paragraph, the importance of formalising procedures at the brigade and 
battalion levels, especially in the phase of analysis, is discussed more exhaustive. 
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6.4 In-depth discussion 
Two of the similarities found in the previous paragraph are discussed more thoroughly here. 
Although they were found in both cases, they are especially interesting during the conduct of 
operations. 
Comparing previous lessons identified with new lessons 
In both cases, it was found that there were no systems available to support the comparison of 
older and newer lessons identified. That type of comparison is especially important during the 
execution of operations. During an exercise, the role of the opponent is “played” by another 
unit from within the own army, or from an allied army. In general, NATO armies are quite 
similar when it comes to for example materiel and doctrine. This implies that the simulated 
enemy will behave quite similar to the own units during exercises. During operations abroad, 
the opponent often differs a lot from the Norwegian Army. Its conduct of operations can be 
very different and can vary over time. As discussed in the first chapter, the opponent will 
learn from experience just as the own unit does and it will adjust its conduct accordingly. 
Thus, the amount of identified lessons during operations is expected to be much greater than 
during exercises. This means that in order to process all those lessons, in a period as short as 
possible, one should be able to store lessons identified that are not implemented in a 
(database-) system. If that lesson frequently reoccurs in a comparable manner, it can be 
recognised during the phase of analysis. That reoccurrence can lead to the implementation of 
a lesson that initially was not valued high enough. Without a proper system to support that 
analysis, comparison is not or only limitedly possible. 
This thesis does not aim at answering the question as to why a suitable system for comparison 
was not available during both cases. It only shows that is was valued as desirable to have such 
a system available during both cases. Based on the theory in chapter three, developing such a 
(database-) system can be beneficial to support the analysis phase of lessons learned 
processes. The author is however sceptical on the practical feasibility of developing such a 
system: lessons identified are so complex, with so many external parameters and so many 
differences in between units, all with their own equipment, operating procedures, personnel 
etc., that finding previously identified lessons that are relevant to compare with new lessons, 
is extremely complex. For further research on the feasibility of such a system, an analysis of 
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NATO’s Lessons Learned Portal Library and the system used by the NATO Joint Analysis 
and Lessons Learned Centre31 could be a good starting point. 
Informal processes at brigade and battalion level 
In both cases, the battalion level’s processes related to analysis and storage of lessons were 
classified as medium. Processes did take place, but in an informal manner, not being 
described in standard operating procedures or other steering documents. That same applied to 
Brigade North during Trident Juncture. Especially at the lower levels within the hierarchy, the 
analysis of experiences is of significant importance. In the first place, if analysis at the lower 
levels is not conducted in a systematic manner, the risk that those lessons cannot be 
transferred throughout the rest of the hierarchy grows. In the second place, the reliability of 
experiences during operations is often questionable. During, and especially after an exercise, 
it is possible to converse with the party that within the scenario acted as the opposing party. 
Such discussions can lead to a deep understanding of the actual course of the exercise and of 
the cause and effect relationships of its results, thus improving the quality of the observations 
and their analysis. Usually, that sort of discussions are not possible during or after operations 
abroad. Haaland describes the problematic usability of experience as a source for learning 
during military operations: …uncertainty about what factor causes which effects, makes it 
hard to interpret experiences (2016, p. 1003). This so-called causal ambiguity of experience 
occurs expectedly much more frequently during operations than during exercises. It is 
therefore of special importance that analysis of experiences during operations is conducted in 
a thorough manner. Implementing formal procedures related to analysis and implementation 
of experiences at brigade and battalion level can increase the quality of those processes. 
Although the phases of analysis and storage were not formally described at battalion level 
during the operations in Afghanistan, learning did take place. A possible explanation for this 
can be found in the threat dimension during operations. Operations abroad are almost without 
exception conducted under difficult circumstances and with a certain amount of threat. The 
opponent is real and is striving for its own success. During exercises, the threat is simulated 
and would only in very rare cases be real. Thus, lessons identified during operations would in 
theory receive more priority because not being able to learn lessons in those threatening 
circumstances could lead to more serious consequences than during exercises. The sense of 
                                               
31 See http://www.jallc.nato.int  
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urgency increases within the whole of the Armed Force, because of which it is often easier to 
implement changes during operations than it would be during and after exercises. A good 
example is given by Erstad and Folkestad  (2016, p. 48) who state that the acquisition of new 
or other materiel as a result of experiences during operations is done much quicker than 
during peacetime conditions. This increase in priority during operations could lead and has 
led to learning occurring despite a lack of formal processes with regard to analysis and storage 
at battalion level. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
  
 
 
68 
7. Conclusions 
The central question of this thesis is: 
What are the similarities and differences between the way the Norwegian Army and its 
subunits learned from experience during the operations in Afghanistan from 2005 until 2012 
and the exercise Trident Juncture in 2018, and how can they be explained? 
The most significant difference between the lessons learned processes during the Afghanistan 
period and Trident Juncture was the involvement of the Norwegian Army Command and 
Brigade North. Both were only limitedly involved in those processes related to the operations 
in Afghanistan, whereas that involvement was much greater with respect to Trident Juncture. 
An explanation can be found in the chain of command. In the Afghanistan period, neither of 
the two levels was part of the chain of command of the mission. In Trident Juncture, that was 
only partly the case, but there, the peacetime chain of command was used, initiated by the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters at the top level, involving both the Army Command and 
Brigade North in the process. Whether that approach would have been preferable during the 
Afghanistan period, too, is not clear, but it would have led to a larger commitment of the 
Army Command (and possibly Brigade North, too) in the lessons learned processes of one of 
the most intense periods of the Norwegian Army in the recent past. 
Four similarities have been found in the research. The first similarity is that case-by-case 
guidance regarding the lessons learned procedures was issued to the units, and that in most 
cases that guidance was executed accordingly. The explanation is that existing organisation-
wide lessons learned procedures were not sufficiently detailed for units to use. Thus, if 
learning from experience had to occur in an active manner, additional guidelines were 
required. Furthermore, both the operations in Afghanistan and the exercise Trident Juncture 
were seen as important enough to prioritise resources on issuing and executing case-by-case 
guidance to the various levels within the Army to conduct tailor-made lessons learned 
processes. 
The second similarity is that in those units where the processes were labelled high in most or 
all phases, dedicated personnel with respect to lessons learned processes was part of the 
organisation. That did not only apply to formal positions, but also to units that appointed an 
officer with primary responsibility for lessons learned processes, as it was done by the Army 
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Command during Trident Juncture. The explanation for this is that personnel that is dedicated 
to learning from experience within a unit is strongly motivated to expand their knowledge on 
lessons learned processes, and to use a significant amount of effort in optimising them.  
The third similarity is that it was perceived as problematic to compare previously identified 
lessons with new ones during the analysis phase of the learning process. This can be 
explained by the fact that there were no suitable systems available to support such a 
comparison. During the Afghanistan period, FERDABALL was still operational, but 
according to the sources used in this thesis that system was not suitable for the purpose of 
comparing identified lessons. During Trident Juncture, there was no lessons learned support 
system available at all. 
The fourth and final similarity is that at battalion level, and to some extent at brigade level, 
analysis and storage of experiences and identified lessons is conducted predominantly in an 
informal manner. Processes do occur but are not formalised in standard operating procedures 
or other steering documents. A clear explanation of this has not been found during the 
research. However, during the interviews the author did notice that knowledge on lessons 
learned processes in various units within the Army was not strongly developed32. Collection 
of experiences can be a relatively straight-forward activity but conducting analysis and 
subsequently implementation of identified lessons does require a deeper understanding of 
those processes. A lack of knowledge on lessons learned processes within the Army’s units, 
both during the operations in Afghanistan and the exercise Trident Juncture, could therefore 
be an explanation of this similarity. 
Although many researchers and personnel within the Norwegian Army are critical on its 
ability to learn from experience, in practice the subject does receive attention and priority 
within the Army’s tactical units, the Land Warfare Centre and the Norwegian Army 
Command. Processes related to learning from experience do occur, although often not in a 
formalised manner. Formalising those processes, for example by describing them in the 
standard operating procedures within the Army’s units, could improve the quality of the way 
the Norwegian Army learns from experience, both during operations and exercises.
                                               
32 See paragraph 5.3 
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Annex A: Questionnaire and interviewees 
 
Questionnaire, as used during the interviews 
 
Theme Question Objective 
Introduction Can you describe your current job? Getting to know each other, setting 
atmosphere. 
 Can you describe the role your unit had during 
Trident Juncture 2018? 
Understanding the unit’s position and 
role during TRJE. 
 Can you point out which lessons have been 
identified and / or learned during and after TRJE? 
Getting a feeling on how to proceed 
during the rest of the interview. 
 
Formal processes 
throughout the NAF 
/ the Norwegian 
Army 
Is there a formal lessons learned process within 
the Norwegian Armed Forces / the Army, related 
to TRJE18 (or more general)? 
• Where is it described formally? 
• What does it look like? 
• What is your role in that process? 
• Who is overall responsible for LL within 
the army / armed forces? 
• Did you have to file one or more LL 
reports during and/or after TRJE? 
• Have additional guidelines on LL been 
issued in relationship to TRJE? 
• General intro into theme 
• Search for relevant current 
documents 
 
Own unit 
General 
 
Is there an (in)formal lessons learned process 
within your unit, related specifically to TRJE or 
more general? 
• Has that process been described? 
• Search for relevant current 
documents 
Own unit 
Collection 
 
Does your unit actively collect lessons / 
experiences? 
• (How) does your unit collect 
experiences from personnel within the 
unit? AAR´s? PXD´s? 
• (How) does your unit induce the lower 
units to learn from experience? SOP´s? 
• How) does your unit collect experience 
from own, lower units? Cross-level 
meetings? Forms or reports? 
• Variables related to collection 
 
Own unit 
Analysis 
Does your unit actively conduct analysis on 
collected lessons? 
• Are there reports available to use? 
• Are there roles defined for people to 
analyse lessons? 
• Variables related to analysis 
Own unit 
Storage 
 
Does your unit change elements of DOTMLPF-I 
as a result of lessons? 
 
 
• Variables related to storage 
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Own unit, 
Dissemination 
How does your unit spread lessons it has learned 
to other parts of the organization? 
 
 
Other If you are not satisfied with the LL process 
currently in use, what changes would you 
suggest? 
 
 
 
List of interviewees 
 
Date Unit Rank and name Job description 
30 January 2019 Brigade North Major Reidar Krogstad Exercise Planner 
31 January 2019 Norwegian Joint 
Headquarters 
Kommandørkaptein Tor 
Arne Halvorsen 
Chief of the Section for 
Operational Experiences 
07 February 2019 2nd Battalion Kaptein Mathias Becker Commander Combat Support 
Company 
07 February 2019 2nd Battalion Major Stian Stormo Operations Officer 
08 February 2019 Norwegian Army 
Command 
Oberstløytnant Karen Sofie 
Netland 
Chief Norwegian Land 
Operation Centre 
13 February 2019 Land Warfare Centre Oberstløytnant Jon Vie Chief Section for Lessons 
Learned 
13 February 2019 Telemark Battalion Kaptein Brage Reinaas Operations Officer 
13 February 2019 Telemark Battalion Løytnant Hans Marius 
Skjærbæk 
Planning Officer 
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Annex B: Abbreviations 
 
 
BDE N Brigade North 
BN Battalion 
FERDABALL Forsvarets ErfaringsDatabase Lessons Learned (the Norwegian Armed Forces Lessons Learned Database) 
LL Lessons Learned 
LWC Land Warfare Centre 
NAC Norwegian Army Command 
NAF Norwegian Armed Forces 
NJHQ Norwegian Joint Headquarters 
NORA The Norwegian Army 
PXD Post Exercise Discussion 
SLL Section for Lessons Learned, part of the Land Warfare Centre 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
TRADOK Transformasjons- og doktrine kommando (predecessor of the Land Warfare Centre) 
TRJE / TRJE18 Trident Juncture 2018 
 
 
